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CORPORATE REHABILITATION UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1973: ARE REPORTS
OF THE DEMISE OF CHAPTER XI
GREATLY EXAGGERATED?
ROBERT

J.

ROSENBERGt

The revolutionary alteration in the nature of bankruptcy proceedings from basically judicial to basically administrative has received
much critical attention to date in discussions of the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973.1 Certainly, this fundamental change will have as
profound effects upon corporate reorganization proceedings as it will
have upon liquidation proceedings.2 A specific evaluation of corporate
rehabilitation procedure under Chapter VII of the Proposed Act must,
however, inevitably focus not upon the Bankruptcy Administration but
upon the collapse of the present bifurcated scheme into a single reorganization process.
The draftsmen of the Chandler Act of 1938,1 which added the
present "Chapter proceedings" 4 to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 5 provided alternative systems for relieving embarrassed corporations:
Chapter X, a thoroughgoing reorganization typically accompanied by
t Member of the New York Bar; Adjunct Professor, Rutgers, The State University School of Law, Newark. This article was prepared with the able assistance of Diana S. Donaldson, The Ohio State University College of Law, Class of 1975, and is dedicated with great appreciation to the memory of Professor Charles Seligson.
1. The proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Act], was originally promulgated as Part II of
the REPORT OF THn COMMIssIoN ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS or THE UNrTED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as CoMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States [hereinafter
cited as the Commission] was established by the Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91354, 84 Stat. 468. The three-part Commission Report, including the Proposed Act, is
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
available
2. from
For athe
discussion of the concept of administrative bankruptcy, see 1 CoMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 103-56.
3. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
4. The "Chapter proceedings" are: Bankruptcy Act § 101-276, 11 U.S.C. §
501-676 (1970) (Chapter X); id. § 301-99, 11 U.S.C. § 701-99 (Chapter XI); id.
§ 401-526, 11 U.S.C. §§ 801-926 (Chapter XII); and id. § 601-86, 11 U.S.C. §§ 100186 (Chapter XIII). Chapter XII is a recently rediscovered procedure for real property
arrangements by noncorporate debtors which also would disappear as a separate proceeding under the Proposed Act, while Chapter XIII provides for wage-earner plans and
would be transformed into Chapter VI of the Proposed Act. Inasmuch as the topic of
the present discussion is corporate rehabilitation, Chapters XII and XIII are irrelevant,
and the focus herein will be on Chapters X and XI.
5. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
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complete recapitalization; and Chapter XI, intended to permit "simple"
compositions with unsecured creditors. In the ensuing years, Chapter
XI emerged as the much favored vehicle, for obvious reasons. In most
Chapter X proceedings, the debtor's management is replaced by an independent trustee,8 and any proposed plan, to pass statutory muster,
must provide for the elimination (or, where the debtor is solvent, at
least a severe scaling down) of equity interests in the reorganized entity.7 When management also holds a substantial portion of the equity
interests, a typical situation in medium-sized corporations, the preference for Chapter XI becomes overwhelmingly, sometimes desperately,
strong. This is not to say that there often are not more benevolent
reasons for resistance to Chapter X; Chapter XI has substantial advantages over the more extensive procedures in terms of speed, economy,
and flexibility of consummation, which can ultimately mean a larger
pie to be shared for the benefit of all concerned parties.8
It certainly was not intended that the form of relief be chosen in
the sole discretion of the embarrassed debtor corporation. Nonetheless, the draftsmen failed to provide any standards in the statute for
deciding when the more cumbersome and expensive procedures of
Chapter X are required. Supreme Court statements on the subject
border on the metaphysical and provide very little assistance in any particular case. The inevitable result in all too many cases has been protracted and expensive litigation at the commencement of debtor relief
proceedings, which depletes the assets of the estate and delays commencement of the rehabilitation effort.
The consolidation of Chapters X and XI into a single corporate reorganization chapter, then, if it accomplishes nothing else, will eliminate the initial litigation over which type of relief is appropriate. At
what price, however, is this early harmony achieved? Even a cursory
glance at the proposed provisions of Chapter VII reveals that the procedures and substantive protections much more closely resemble cur6. See note 18 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 160-68 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 113-22 infra.
9. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965) (focusing upon
the need to adjust widely-held public debt, and the whole history of the company and
history of mismanagement); General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956)
('Ihe essential difference [between Chapters X and XI] is not between the small company and the large company but between the needs to be served," focusing upon the need
for an accounting by management for misdeeds, the need for new management, and
whether a feasible plan could result under Chapter XI); SEC v. United States Realty
& Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940) (decided when Chapter XI plans had to be
"fair and equitable" as well as "for the best interests of creditors," and hence of questionable precedential value).
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rent Chapter X proceedings -than they do those under present Chapter
XI. This orientation toward the adaptation and modernization of
Chapter X practice is intended to eliminate the abuses perceived in
the relatively free-wheeling Chapter XI procedures. To be sure,
Chapter XI, with its emphasis on speed and econony, has within it the
seeds of abuse; to the extent that Chapter X is considered to be a voracious demon to be avoided at all costs, the tendency to "stretch" the
reach, standards, and procedures of Chapter XI has resulted in some
startling misapplications in the hands of "creative" attorneys. However,
the flexibility of the procedures and appropriate exercises of imagination by reorganization lawyers have often resulted in the consummation of Chapter XI arrangements that are clearly in the best interests
of all parties involved. This is especially true where it is reasonably certain that the bankrupt "patient," because of expense, delay, and
interruption of operations, would have died on the elaborate operating
table of Chapter X. Thus, the crucial inquiry becomes: in adopting
most of the Chapter X safeguards in proposed 'Chapter VII to eliminate the major abuses inherent in Chapter XI, have the draftsmen of
proposed Chapter VII eliminated, at the same time, the creativity permitted by Chapter XI that often results in successful rehabilitation?
To state the question colloquially, have the draftsmen thrown out the
baby with the bath water? Unfortunately, the most that can presently
be said in response to this question is "probably not, but it depends"-depends upon the gloss placed by the Administrator and the courts
upon several proposed provisions that are intended to mitigate the severity of current Chapter X in important, basic ways. On the other
hand, the adoption of what is basically Chapter X procedure will also
result in additional flexibility in certain areas for consummating plans
that, under the present statute, would fall within Chapter XI, to the
extent that they will still be permitted under Chapter VII.
Accordingly, this article will examine present Chapter XI, and attempt to isolate its weaknesses and strengths. The inquiry throughout
will be: to what extent are the latter retained and the former eliminated in the proposed Chapter VII.
I.

DOES

PROPOSED CHAPTER

VII

ELIMINATE

WASTEFUL

INITIAL

LITIGATION RESULTING FROM THE PREFERENCE FOR CHAPTER

XI?

It was inevitable that the existence of alternative schemes of rehabilitation, one of which leaves management firmly in control, and the
other of which not only replaces management with an independent
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trustee but investigates it, and eliminates or scales down its equity
holdings, would result in the filing of a Chapter XI rather than
a Chapter X when any conceivable argument could be made for the
propriety of that lesser form of relief. After all, management has little
to lose in the subsequent battle, where the opposition is usually led by
the Securities and Exchange Commission,'0 in removing the proceeding into Chapter X; corporate, not personal, assets are being expended.
Interestingly, in recent years the volume of this sort of litigation has
lessened considerably. This phenomenon has been variously explained. Since the SEC is typically the only party in interest that actively seeks to transfer Chapter XI proceedings," an expanded role for
the Commission in Chapter XI, specifically approved by the Supreme
Court,' 2 may account for the recent decline in motions to transfer.
Now that the SEC is free to investigate and otherwise participate in
Chapter XI, it can act to protect public investors, presumably its primary source of concern, without seeking a transfer. Furthermore, the
SEC has been occupied in recent years with an increasing caseload in
the securities area, so that its ability to monitor reorganization cases has
diminished. New Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 11-15(b)' 8 sets a
120-day deadline from the first meeting of creditors for the making
of a transfer motion unless the court, for cause shown, extends the time
limit. It is too early to judge the effects of this rule on SEC policy;
it could well result in an even further decline in the number of transfer
motions, or could just as easily reverse current willingness to monitor
and participate in Chapter XI proceedings, since the SEC (or any other
party in interest) will usually be precluded from making the transfer
motion later in the proceeding.
10. Bankruptcy Act § 328, 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970). See text accompanying note
13 infra for a discussion of bankruptcy rule 11-15.
11. Of course, this is not invariably the case. See, e.g., Schreibman v. Mason, 377
F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1967) (bondholder petitioned for transfer); In re Meister Brau, Inc.,
355 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (shareholder sought the transfer); In re Rice Barton
Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Mass. 1970) (one creditor out of six hundred sought transfer). See also In re Precision Transformer Corp., 333 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1964) (despite the pendency of an SEC section 328 motion, creditors holding claims totaling almost $200,000 filed an involuntary Chapter X petition).
12. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 613 (1965). The expanded rule was first approved by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Canandaigua Enterprises
Corp., 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964).
13. Rules of Practice and Procedure for Bankruptcy have now been adopted, pursuant to authority conferred upon the Judicial Conference of the United States by 28
U.S.C. § 331 (1970) for ordinary bankruptcy and Chapter XIII proceedings, for Chapter XI proceedings (effective July 1, 1974), and for Chapter X proceedings (effective
August 1, 1975). These rules may be found in BANKRUPTCY ACT AND RULES (Collier
pamphlet ed. 1975).
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Another cause, perhaps, of the reduced volume of litigation is the
fact that the guidelines for determining which chapter is suitable have
become quite flexible. At present, it is relatively rare that a corporation will be forced into Chapter X when its only hope for rehabilitation
lies in Chapter X. If a proceeding will "adjust" "publicly held debt,"
however, the court should remain predisposed to grant a transfer to
Chapter X. 1 4 Courts appear to be disposed to define those terms to
reach the pragmatic result desired.1 5 To the extent that the combination of these developments prevents cases like General Stores, Inc.,
14. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 615 (1965).
15. For example, courts have characterized some types of securities as not "publicly held." Where a plan provided for $9.2 million worth of convertible debentures held
by one or more insurance companies to be replaced by preferred stock, the Sixth Circuit
found the debentures too closely held to be considered "publicly held debt," and also
ruled that shares held by at least seventy-seven persons were not publicly held. In re
KDI Corp., 477 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1973); cf. SEC Rule 146(g), 40 Fed. Reg. 21710
(1975), which presumptively limits a private offering of securities under section 4(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970), to thirty-five persons. The Third
Circuit has deemed important the fact that there were no preferred stockholders and no
bondholders in a corporation and that management controlled over half the common
stock, so that publicly held equity would not alone require a transfer. In re Lea Fabrics,
Inc., 272 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), vacated as moot sub nom. SEC v. Lea Fabrics, Inc.,
363 U.S. 417 (1960). On the other hand, debt was characterized as "publicly held"
where bonds were originally issued almost solely to the members of an organization.
Mecca Temple of Ancient Arabic Order v. Darrock, 142 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 784 (1944). There was evidence there that the bonds had become scattered and that many were in the hands of nonmembers at the time a Chapter XI petition was filed.
While "publicly held debt" typically refers to the debt which existed at the time
the Chapter XI petition was filed, the term appears to be expanding in one respect: the
Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit's view that stock issued as the result of
an arrangement should receive a clean bill of health in order to protect public investors.
SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 615-16 (1965). Chapter X may
thus be appropriate any time debt instruments which may be publicly traded are issued
for claims, not on a theory that such issuance actually "adjusts" publicly held debt, but
that "publicly held debt" includes debt resulting from an arrangement. In debating the
merits of Chapter X, the Second Circuit considered whether the "General Debentures"
to be issued to unsecured creditors would themselves become publicly traded and would
therefore require prior SEC investigation. Grayson-Robinson Stores v. SEC, 320 F.2d
940 (2d Cir. 1963). It determined that the SEC had not shown evidence of very much
potential trading in the instruments and thus affirmed the lower court's order denying
the transfer to Chapter X.
Often the absolute priority rule applicable in Chapter X will benefit public creditors
at the expense of public stockholders. One court balanced the interests of public holders
of debt against those of public holders of equity and allowed the proceeding to remain
in Chapter XI. In re American Guar. Corp., 246 F. Supp. 322 (D.R.I. 1965). There,
public debtholders were required to waive interest under the proposed plan, a sacrifice
which was not regarded as a "major adjustment," and substantial equity was preserved
for shareholders.
On the other hand, courts have found that a transfer to Chapter X would cause
credit to evaporate so that the interests of debenture holders would be injured by a transfer. In re Wilcox-Gay Corp., 133 F. Supp. 548 (W.D. Mich. 1955), affd sub nom. SEC
v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956).
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where five years after the dismissal of a Chapter XI proceeding, with
five years' worth of accompanying Chapter X administration expenses,
the identical plan was proposed in a Chapter X proceeding and confirmed,1 6 reason will have won the day.

In that event, consolidation

of the two chapters into a single chapter, with the attendant disadvantages, may be premature.

It is hardly certain, however, that proposed Chapter VII will
achieve elimination of initial litigation. The debate over which chapter
is appropriate often focuses on the need for a trustee to perform an
independent investigation. If the choice is only a decision as to
whether a trustee is required, proposed Chapter VII, by collapsing
Chapters X and XI but retaining the discretionary decision as to the
need for a trustee, will have done little to alleviate the litigation-producing aspects of multiple chapters.
Recognizing the relationship between the transfer and the desirability of an investigation, courts generally take a pragmatic view of
what has already been accomplished in Chapter XI.17 If the court concludes that a trustee would be redundant and if the debts of the business are large .enough that a trustee would be mandatory in Chapter
X,18 the court may decide to deny the transfer and avoid the expense

of a trustee. In proposed Chapter VII, the issue of the appointment
of a trustee cannot be circumvented in this way. If the debtor is a
corporation having debts of one million dollars or more and 300 or
more security holders, 9 section 7-102(a) requires the Administrator
16. Weintraub & Levin, A Sequel to Chapter X or Chapter XI: Coexistence for
the Middle-Sized Corporation,26 FoRD. L. REv. 292, 301 (1957).
17. In fact, one court stated that it would not confirm a Chapter XI plan unless
it was the result of an "intelligent, efficient and disinterested investigation" of the debtor.
In re Credit Service, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 979, 982 (D. Md. 1940). In In re American
Guar. Corp., 246 F. Supp. 322 (D.R.I. 1965), since the plan called for an investigation
directed by the referee of the allegations made by the SEC against past management,
to be paid for by the debtor and the results to be reported to the SEC and all creditors
and shareholders, the court denied the SEC's motion to dismiss the Chapter XI proceed.
ings. See also In re Barchris Constr. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), in which
the court mistakenly asserted that no section 21a investigation had been conducted and
cited that failure as the factor militating in favor of transfer to Chapter X. When the
attorney for the receiver advised the court after its opinion was filed that such an inquiry
had indeed been made, the court reaffirmed its original decision because the investigation, "while significant," was not "conclusive of the issues that were before the court."
Id. at 236.
18. The judge must appoint a trustee if the indebtedness of the debtor, liquidated
as to amount and not contingent as to liability, is $250,000 or over. Bankruptcy Act
§ 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970); R. BANER. P. 10-202.
19. "Securities" is defined to include both debt and equity securities. Proposed Act
§ 1-102(42).
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to apply to the court to determine whether a trustee shall be appointed,
and such appointment is presumptive. Thus, the collapse of the two
chapters may do no more than push the litigation stage from the filing
of the petition to the appointment of the trustee.20 It may be argued
that a debtor of the requisite size will be discouraged from contesting
the appointment of the trustee by the presumption established by the
statute. However, it must be remembered that management has everything to lose from the appointment of such a trustee, and, given the
availability of the debtor's funds for the purpose, very little to lose in
fighting to retain its position.
Ironically, the elimination of litigation over form of relief through
the integration of the chapters and the inclusion of the presumptions
as to the appointment of the trustee may prove to be too effective: it
may serve to discourage management's filing of a reorganization petition at the time when everyone would benefit most therefrom. The
automatic penalty that will attach to most petitions can only reinforce
a Pollyanna-like attitude in management, for it has nothing to gain in
realistically assessing a situation and recognizing that unaided recovery
is not just around the comer. The only check on this aspect of human
nature in proposed Chapter VII is the possibility of a creditors' petition. 21 But creditors are seldom privy to the full range of information
about the debtor that will result in a decision on the timing of the petition that will maximize its benefits for -them. They will seldom realize
that they should demand such information until the extent of the difficulties can no longer be kept private, at which time the most appropriate moment will probably already have passed. Furthermore, an
involuntary petition will seldom be uncontested.2 2 It can hardly be
argued that litigation is avoided in this way.
II.

DOES PROPOSED CHAPTER VII ELIMINATE THE ABUSIVE
ASPECTS OF CHAPTER XI?

Chapter XI procedure is, as noted, bottomed upon the continua20. Cf. Kennedy, Foreword, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 381, 397 (1973): "Chapter VII
of the Proposed Act thus eliminates the pointless, time-consuming, expensive, and possibly fatal litigation of the question whether the case is being prosecuted under the right
chapter."
21. "One or more creditors having claims not contingent as to liability and aggregating at least $10,000, or an indenture trustee on behalf of security holders having
claims aggregating at least $10,000, may file a petition against the debtor for relief under
Chapter VII." Proposed Act § 4-205(b).
22. Cf. Proposed Act §§ 4-208 to -210. Again, the debtor's funds will be used
for this purpose, so there is no incentive to concede the issue.
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tion of the debtor in possession of his own property. Unless the Chapter XI petition is filed in a pending bankruptcy in which a trustee has
already been appointed,2 3 no trustee is provided for in the Chapter XI
scheme. Under the new Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Chapter
XI, the appointment of a receiver is also discouraged; 24 in some juris21
dictions this represents a substantial departure from prior practice.
Authorization for the continued operation of the business by the debtor in possession is routine in Chapter XI,2 6 although the debtor then
becomes an officer of the court and thus subject to the court's overThe court's authority is broad: it "shall have all the title and
sight.
exercise all the powers of a trustee appointed under this Act. ' 28 Accordingly, all of the rights, duties, and powers of a bankruptcy trustee
are available to the debtor in possession, subject, however, to whatever
"limitations, restrictions, terms, and conditions as the court may from
time to time prescribe. ' 29 At the very least, the debtor in possession
is required to file periodic reports on the operations of the business
with the court. 0
In circumstances evidencing possible past management misdeeds,
it is easy to criticize continuing the debtor in possession over the objection of even a single creditor or stockholder. In many such cases, however, a traditional Chapter XI composition with unsecured creditors
would be perfectly adequate to revitalize the financial standing of the
debtor, and either there is not a large number of public creditors needing the protection of the absolute priority rule, 31 or there are offsetting
considerations. 32 The transfer of such a case to Chapter X solely to
obtain an independent investigation of management is a perfect ex23. Bankruptcy Act § 321, 332, 11 U.S.C. § 721, 732; R. BANKR. P. 11-7, -18(a).
24. R. BAiuc. P. 11-18(b) provides that if no trustee in a prior liquidating bankruptcy has previously qualified, "the debtor shall continue in possession" but "[o]n application of any party in interest, the court may, for cause shown, appoint a receivei
to take charge of the property and operate the business of the debtor" (emphasis added).
25. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for
example, prior to the adoption of the Chapter XI rules, appointed a receiver as a matter
of course in Chapter XI proceedings.
26. "Continuation of the business represents the norm in Chapter XI cases ..
R. BAxNK. P. 11-23, Advisory Comm. Note. See also Bankruptcy Act § 343, 11 U.S.C.
§ 743 (1970).
27. Urban Properties Corp. v. Benson, Inc., 116 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1940).
28. Bankruptcy Act § 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970). To the extent that a Chapter
X trustee's powers may be broader, the debtor in possession is endowed with them as
well. In re Schokbeton Indus. v. Schokbeton Prods. Corp., 466 F.2d 171, 174-75 (5th
Cir, 1972).
29. Bankruptcy Act § 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970).
30. Id. § 343, 11 U.S.C. § 743; R. BANKR. P. 11-23.
31. See note 161 infra.
32. See note 15 supra.
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ample of sacrificing the pragmatism and flexibility of Chapter XI to
some higher good which may ultimately serve nobody's best interests,
since the "price" of the transfer may be a sharply reduced return to

creditors or even a depletion of assets of the debtor to the point where
it cannot continue in business. This is not to imply, however, that an
investigation is dispensible in such circumstances; indeed, it may take
on added significance inasmuch as the debtor alone proposes a plan

based on information which it controls, and, in virtually every case, will
fashion a proposal that continues the old management's role.33 In this
regard, management may intentionally not look very hard for outside

sources of funding that would provide for a higher payout in the plan,
but that, because of the protections and compensation demanded by

the third-party financier, may result in a dilution of management's role
or interests.

Where management also represents a substantial portion

of the equity interest, a confirmed Chapter XI plan, given the absence
of the absolute priority principle, will permit management qua shareholder to reap the benefits of the going-concern value of the business

despite past and possibly future misdeeds.34 Thus, if Chapter XI in
this context is to operate reasonably fairly, a determination that man-

agement misdeeds have not caused the present difficulties is essential.
Otherwise, the dual benefits accruing to management-retention of

position and acquisition of the going-concern value of the enterprise
at the expense of the creditors-are indefensible. Yet such a result
is not infrequent in Chapter XI.
Of course, it is true that a trustee is not the only means by which
this function of investigation can be performed.

On occasion, the cred-

itors' committee has thoroughly examined the debtor pursuant to its
statutory authority,35 but, more often than not, it will have no particular
interest in doing so, for reasons to be explored. Some courts have de33. Of course, failure "to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or deficiency
of assets to meet . . . [the debtor's] liabilities" is a ground for denying the confirmation
of a Chapter XI plan. Bankruptcy Act §§ 366(3), 14c(7), 11 U.S.C. §§ 766(3), 32c
(7) (1970). However, objection on this ground must be specifically made, or the court
has no independent duty with respect thereto. R. BANin. P. 11-38(d).
34. "Going concern value" is used herein to mean the excess of value in the business enterprise over the liquidation value of the tangible assets. Such value is generally
determined by a capitalization of the earnings of the enterprise. The difference between
the two figures represents "good will," a highly valuable asset if the business is continued
but typically worthless upon liquidation. See generally 1 A. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY
OF CORPOXArONs 284-90 & nn.j-o (5th ed. 1953). Where, as in Chapter X, the absolute priority principle applies, this going concern value must be distributed first to the
senior creditors. See note 161 infra.
35. Bankruptcy Act §§ 21a, 336(3), 339(1)(a), 11 U.S.C. §§ 44a, 736(3), 739
(1)(a) (1970); R. BANKR. P. 205, 11-26, -29.
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nied a petition for transfer to Chapter X on the grounds that, even if
substantial evidence of management wrongdoing is uncovered, the
stockholders' derivative action is an available alternative to the Chapter
X trustee as a means of redress. 6 Occasionally, courts have even re37
tained jurisdiction for the purpose of hearing such a derivative action.
The problem here is that a stockholder will seldom have incentive,
even assuming the available means, to commit financial resources to
a thorough investigation of management. An investigation by a stockholder rather than by a trustee will initially (and, unless he is successful
in recovering a judgment, ultimately) be at his rather than at the estate's expense. This problem is magnified where management is not
only in control of the information but represents a substantial portion of
the equity holdings. In that case, there may be additional barriers to the
bringing of a derivative action. 33 Thus, it would seem that, in the absence of a strong and independent creditors' committee to do the investigation (a rarity indeed), the stockholders' derivative action as a
substitute for an investigation by managment is more theoretical than
real. In too many cases, therefore, the management of Chapter XI
debtors is allowed to get away with, if not murder, at least fraud or
gross injustice vis a vis creditors and outside stockholders. A transfer
to Chapter X to correct such problems, however, may produce even
greater pain to the innocent victims through a smaller recovery or elimination of their interests, with meager compensation coming from the
knowledge that the wrongdoers have lost their positions.
The proposed Chapter VII adopts a slight modification of the
Chapter X approach to the appointment of a trustee: as noted, the
appointment is presumptive, but not mandatory, if there are more than
one million dollars in debts and 300 or more security holders; below
Two leading
those guidelines the appointment is discretionary. 30
Chapter XI practitioners have conjured up visions of the appointment
of a trustee in every case under Chapter VII because of "[f]irst, a discretionary power in the administrator to suggest a trustee in all cases
36. Grayson-Robinson Stores v. SEC, 320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963); In re American Guar. Corp., 246 F. Supp. 322 (D.R.I. 1965); cf. In re Lea Fabrics, Inc., 272 F.2d
769 (3d Cir. 1959), vacated as moot sub nom. SEC v. Lea Fabrics, Inc., 363 U.S. 417
(1960); In re Transvision, Inc., 217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
952 (1955).
37. In re Wilcox-Gay Corp., 133 F. Supp. 548 (W.D. Mich. 1955), aff'd sub nom.
SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956).
38. Cf. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703
(1974).
39. Proposed Act § 7-102(a).
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and, secondly, what amounts to a subliminal indication that in public
cases the appointment of the trustee by the administrator would become the rule rather than the exception." 40 That this result is not intended by the Commission is made clear by its note to proposed section
7-102. Indeed, its intent is quite the contrary: by establishing an administrative agency, the Commission believes that it will reduce the
number of situations in which a disinterested trustee will be needed.
The Proposed Act specifically provides that if a trustee is not appointed, the Administrator may perform certain of the duties of the
trustee: he may, inter alia,
(5) investigate the acts, conduct, liabilities, and financial condition
of the debtor, the operation of his business and the desirability
of the continuance thereof, and any other matter relevant to the case
or to the formulation of a plan; (6) ... examine the directors and
officers of the debtor and any other witnesses concerning the foregoing matters; (7) as soon as practicable, file . . . a statement of
his investigation, including any facts ascertained... pertaining to
fraud, misconduct, mismanagement,
irregularities, and causes of
41
action available to the estate.
Proposed section 7-103(b) further provides that, if no trustee is appointed, a "disinterested person" may be appointed by the Administrator, with the approval of the court, to perform the above duties and
also, inter alia, to file a plan-another indication that it is not intended
that trustees be appointed in all instances. Such disinterested person
would certainly not have authority to operate the business in lieu of
the debtor, as a trustee would. One of the draftsmen of proposed Chapter VII recently wrote:
A common complaint thus far heard from debtors' attorneys is that
they will be put out of business because a trustee will be appointed
routinely. That appears .to be neither the concept nor the intent of
the Act. The administrator does not act unilaterally but rather with
the debtor and the creditors' committee. Should he override their
wishes, a court hearing is afforded and with the separation of the
court from the administration
it is unlikely that the court will act as
42
a mere rubber stamp.
43
Further flexibility is provided by proposed section 7-102(d),
40. Weintraub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations)as Proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission, 79 CoM. L.J. 15 (1974).
41. Proposed Act § 7-103(b).
42. King, The Business Reorganization Chapter of the ProposedBankruptcy Code
-Or

Whatever Happened to Chapters X, XI and XII, 78 CoM. L.J. 429, 433 n.12

(1973).
43. Bankruptcy Act §§ 156, 160, 11 U.S.C. §§ 556, 560; R. BANKR. P. 10-202(d).
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which continues an alternative presently available in Chapter X: "[i]f

a disinterested trustee is appointed, a director, officer, or employee of
the debtor may be appointed by the administrator as an additional trus-

tee to operate the business of the debtor."" This provision could
prove to be useful, inasmuch as it would permit the continuation of the
debtor's business by present management, with all of the advantages
of continuity inherent therein, while at the same time providing for an
independent trustee to oversee that operation and to investigate past
misdeeds. Because of restrictive judicial interpretation, the existing
Chapter X provision has proved less useful than a surface reading may
indicate. 5 Liberal use in proposed Chapter VII may provide a sub44. Proposed Act § 7-102(d).
45. In Meredith v. Thralls, 144 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 758
(1944), the court read the standard of disinterestedness as set forth in Bankruptcy Act
§ 158, 11 U.S.C. § 558 (1970), as applicable so far as possible to the additional trustee.
Thus, such trustee could own stock in violation of section 158(1) because directors
would ordinarily own stock, but section 158(4) would apply to disqualify an additional
trustee with an interest materially adverse to a class of creditors or shareholders. Later,
in In re Ocean City Auto. Bridge Co., 184 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1950), the Third Circuit
held that an additional trustee could not even own stock. Congress intended an exception to section 158 only in that someone could be appointed who had "familiarity with
the business of the debtor in the past, but no financial interest in its future, and that
it did not intend to open the doors to the appointment of persons who by reason of ownership of securities or otherwise had an interest in the reorganization of the debtor which
might make it difficult for them to act independently." Id. at 728-29.
Two later cases retreat from the disinterestedness standard outlined previously.
The Second Circuit, in dictum, has stated that whereas the primary trustee must be disinterested, "no such requirement was or practically could be imposed on officers of the
debtor. . .

."

Nazareth Fairgrounds & Farmers' Mkt., Inc. v. Wolf, 296 F.2d 678, 683

(2d Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633
(1963). Another court indicated that it would overturn the appointment of an additional trustee only if a factual showing could be made that the appointment was improper because it was harmful to the interests of creditors, shareholders, or the administration of the debtor. In re Hudson View Towers, Inc., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
BANKR. L. REP. f 61,993, at 71,520 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Its rationale for a loose standard
rested on the ability of the court to remove such a trustee at any time with or without
cause and its desire to use the trustee's knowledge and experience.
One court has read the legislative history of section 156 as limiting the appointment
of an additional trustee to exceptional circumstances in which the individual's services
are essential and it is not feasible to obtain them by employment under section 191. In
re Ocean City Auto. Bridge Co., 184 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1950). If this is a correct reading, a proceeding in Chapter X in which a trustee is appointed will rarely involve the
operation of the business by someone familiar with the debtor. Collier disagrees with
this interpretation, claiming that the language of section 156 and the legislative history
indicate the appointment can be routine. 6 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 7.04, at
1166-67 (14th ed. 1972).
That the draftsmen of proposed section 7-102(d) intended to reject this restrictive
interpretation is clear: "This subdivision also continues the possibility of the appointment of a director, officer, or employee of the debtor, an appointee who obviously would
not meet the disinterested test, as an additional trustee for the sole purpose of conducting
or helping conduct the business and the management of the property of the debtor."
Proposed Act § 7-102, Advisory Comm. Note 6 (emphasis added).
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stantial damper to the opposition that would otherwise arise to the appointment of an independent trustee, and the litigation attendant to
that opposition. On the other hand, the officer in question must then
act as a fiduciary of the creditors,4 6 which may influence his business
judgment. If the decisions he makes in the course of operating the
business are more conservative or otherwise different from those that
he would make if he were not a fiduciary, creditors may not benefit
from his appointment, but may actually suffer therefrom, both in terms
of the extra expense involved and the less oppressive business policies
to be followed. Whether or not the provision ultimately proves to be
useful as a means of defusing opposition to the appointment of a trustee, so that an independent investigation of management may be conducted, may thus turn on the severity of the fiduciary burdens placed
upon the second trustee by the Administrator and the courts. Thus,
proposed Chapter VII contains several permutations for permitting
both an investigation of management and the uninterrupted continuance of the debtor's business. Imaginative use thereof may defuse one
of the most serious built-in conflicts that creditors and outside stockholders face under the present scheme.
As noted, the problem may not have become serious in the first
instance had Chapter XI creditors' committees performed their functions independently and imaginatively. Unlike Chapter X, wherein the
court occupies a position of control over the committees, Chapter XI
envisions a strong, independent creditors' committee. Unfortunately,
such committees have not in practice been noted for their strength or
independence. Chapter XI was founded on the rock of creditor control and has foundered on the shoals of debtor domination.
The statutory functions of the creditors' committee are clearly delineated. At the first meeting of creditors, the court presides over an
examination of the debtor and witnesses, 47 typically conducted by the
attorney for one of the creditors who would like to become attorney
for the official creditors' committee. This initial examination was considered a vital part of the statutory scheme, but generally few creditors
attend the first meeting. After that poorly attended meeting, the
elected creditors' committee itself may "examine into the conduct of
the debtor's affairs and the causes of his insolvency or inability to pay
46. Cf. Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633 (1963).
47. Bankruptcy Act § 336(3), 11 U.S.C. § 736(3) (1970); R. BA1mL. P. 11-25
(a) (2).
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his debts as they mature." 48 The examination by the creditors' committee may be quite informal and, consequently, may produce more
useful information than a court hearing.
The committee may hire attorneys, accountants, and agents to
lend their expertise to the proceedings. 49 Thus the debtor's books may
be audited by an independent accountant, its assets may be appraised
to determine the forced sale value, and a good overall view of the
debtor's operation may be obtained by the committee. The vigilant
committee may, therefore, perform much of the protective function of
a Chapter X trustee by exerting the powers it is given in Chapter XI.
A creditors' committee should act as liaison between all creditors
whom it represents and the debtor.50 It can be quite helpful to the
debtor in urging creditors to cooperate fully with it and in pressuring
creditors to continue to ship essential merchandise so that the debtor
can continue in business. 51 The committee benefits both sides by consulting with the debtor on any proposed plans.52 In fact, the chances
of acceptance of a plan proposed by a debtor without consultation with
the creditors' committee are very slim.5 3 The debtor will not want to
risk antagonizing an active creditors' committee, so its plan will reflect
a negotiated effort, although the statute requires that the plan be "proposed" by the debtor.54
The committee also functions to disseminate continuously information to creditors.5 5 Because it is considered knowledgeable about
the debtor's affairs, its recommendation to accept a plan will sway
creditors' votes. Thus, one court could say:
It is fairly obvious -that no arrangement proposed by or in the interests of the management alone is likely to receive the approval of
disinterested creditors unless and until they are thoroughly satisfied
48. Bankruptcy Act § 339(1)(a), 11 U.S.C. § 739(1)(a) (1970); R. BANaR. P.
11-29(a).
49. Bankruptcy Act § 339(2), 11 U.S.C. § 739(2) (1970); R. BANKR. P. 11-29(b).
50. Bankruptcy Act §§ 339(1)(c)-(f), 11 U.S.C. H9 739(1)(c)-(f) (1970); R.
BANKR. P. 11-29(a).
51. See Levy, Creditors' Committees and Their Responsibilities,74 CoM. L.J. 355
(1969); Walsh, The Creation, Rights, Duties and Compensation of Creditors' Committees under Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 35 (1973).
52. Bankruptcy Act § 339(1)(c), 11 U.S.C. § 739(1)(c) (1970); R. BANKat. P.
11-29(a).
53. See Hertzberg, Chapter XI and Chapter X in BAsic BANKRUPTCY 111, 118 (L.
Abramson ed. 1971).
54. Bankruptcy Act H9 321-23, 11 U.S.C. H9 721-23 (1970). See Note, Allocation
of Corporate Reorganizations between Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 69
HARv. L. REv. 352, 354 (1955).
55. Bankruptcy Act § 339(1)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 739(1)(d) (1970); R. BANKR. P.
11-29(a).
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that what is offered to them in exchange for their present claims is
fair and equitable and in their interests. Under Chapter XI the
creditors' committee seems to be the only effective agency which can
act for the creditors in this respect. 6
An informed creditors' committee is in a position to insist on a wide
variety of safeguards in any recommended extension plan.57 To the
extent that the committee exercises the leverage that it possesses,
creditors will undoubtedly benefit.
Thus, if the creditors' committee performs its function conscientiously and independently, it can greatly help to move the process along.
The existence of a creditors' committee should speed the proceedings
because of the confidence it induces.5" Delay may also be avoided
through the possibility of continuing the creditors' committee into
Chapter XI from a prefiling attempt at an out-of-court settlement; so
long as the majority continues, expenses incurred before the committee
was formally elected in Chapter XI are reimburseable. 59
That, at least, is the theory. The fact is that creditors' committees
have given rise to a wide variety of abuses in many different circumstances. Conceived of as a check upon the powers and control of the
debtor in possession, and to some extent as a substitute for an independent trustee, in far too many cases the creditors' committee becomes a tool of management or of its own agents, or an instrument of
repression for one creditor or class of creditors to dominate the others.
One major source of abuse is the representation by an attorney
of both the committee and a creditor sitting on the committee. Representation of a committee can mean lucrative remuneration for a
minimum of effort, since responsibility for progress in the proceeding
rests not with the committee but with the debtor. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the scenario typically involves attorneys for the major
creditors, to the extent that they are bankruptcy "professionals," vying
with each other for attention at the preliminary creditors' meeting and
at the subsequent official meeting. The object, of course, is to be no56. In re Credit Service, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 979, 982 (D. Md. 1940). See also In
re Nova Shoe Co., 210 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), in which the court viewed the
arrangement as all but accepted where the creditors' committee had approved the debtor's
plan and was about to recommend acceptance to the creditors.
57. Levy, supra note 51, at 361. These safeguards include undated resignations of
management, explicit treatment of future operational losses, and a pledge of issued capital stock.
58. Ashe, Rehabilitation under Chapter XI: Fact or Fiction, 72 CoM. L.J. 259,

262-63 (1967).
59. See text accompanying note 148 infra.
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ticed and selected as attorney for the committee. More often than not,
where a "professional" is involved, an "unofficial" committee will have
been put together by him and will be officialized at the first meeting
on a pro forma basis; not surprisingly, its unofficial "advisor" will then
be retained officially as counsel. This fait accompli is possible because

the attorney already represents one of the creditors.

The inevitable

suspicion then arises: the committee is dominated by the attorney who

is proceeding in the best interests not of the creditors as a whole, but
rather of himself, or his individual client. All too often there is at least
some validity to these suspicions, and sometimes the effects are outrageous. For example, a case has been documented in which a minor
creditor, a competitor of the debtor, retained committee co-counsel to
bid for the assets and urge creditors to reject any plan, so that a liquidation in bankruptcy would be the only viable route.00 In such instances, creditor leadership of the proceeding is a fiction.
A second problem is that far too often the committee is not representative of all creditors. 1 The source of this problem can be traced
to the election of the committee by a majority both in number and
amount of voting claims, i.e. those creditors who bother to participate
in person or by proxy in the first meeting of creditors. 2 Thus, more
often than not, the committee is dominated by institutional creditors
at the expense of individuals, or knowledgeable trade creditors at the
expense of public creditors."3 Obviously, the interests of these three
groups will not necessarily correspond.
60. Salter, An Abuse of Chapter XI (A Case History), 39 Am. BANKR. L.J. 105
(1965). Although the Chapter X trustee performs a plan-reviewing function somewhat
similar to that of the Chapter XI creditors' committees, his position as a fiduciary and
the statutory requirement of disinterestedness demand that no such conflict of interest
exist. E.g., the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit recommended the removal of a
trustee's counsel because his law firm represented a company which had filed a plan of
reorganization in the same proceeding. The attorney's refusal to advise on which plan
should be accepted was considered inadequate to prevent the appearance of a conflict
of interest. Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J.
1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
61. In re FAS Int'l, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (provision for a single
creditors' committee when read with the classification of creditors section "assume[d]
that conflicting interests would be subsumed under a single committee which [was]
charged with representing 'the creditors' without exception," id. at 80); In re Imperial
"400" Nat'l, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 342 (D.N.J. 1966) (public investors had no voice on
creditors' committee); In re Herold Radio & Electronics Corp., 191 F. Supp. 780
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (committee largely composed of trade creditors with only minority representation of debenture holders recommended plan which was found unfair to debenture
holders).
62. Bankruptcy Act §§ 44a, 56, 11 U.S.C. §§ 72a, 92 (1970); R. BANKR. P.
207(b), 11-27.
63. In re Herold Radio & Electronics Corp., 191 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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Attempts at abuse are not limited to these well-established patterns.

In In re Martin Warehouse Distributor, Inc.64 the' creditors'

committee was to retain supervisory powers over the debtor's performance after the confirmation of the plan of arrangement. The plan included a provision which would have exonerated the committee from
all liability except fraud. The court would not allow the committee to
take such extensive powers without concomitant responsibility for its
actions.
One of the more blatant conflicts of interest built into the statutory
scheme with respect to creditors' committees has been corrected by the
new Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Chapter XI. Prior to the
adoption of those rules, the compensation of the attorneys, agents, and
accountants, as well as reimbursement to the committee for its other
expenses, depended entirely upon confirmation of a plan.6 5 Thus the
creditors' committee, and more particularly its agents, usually more
controlling than controlled, were hardly in a position to evaluate independently a plan and recommend its rejection where the alternative
was liquidation of the debtor and no fees to the relevant participants.
The new rules provide that a court may allow reimbursement of creditors' committee expenses whether or not a plan is confirmed. 6 Moreover, the rules make clear that the attorney for the debtor in possession
may be paid as a claim of administration even if Chapter XI is superseded by straight bankruptcy, 7 so that pressure to accept the first plan
proposed may be lessened.
Based on all of the above, it is not surprising that, while the creditors' committee was clearly intended to be part of the essential foundation of Chapter XI, to some extent a quid pro quo for retention of the
debtor in possession of its property, many creditors do not so perceive
it, and in some jurisdictions it is simply dispensed with as an unnecessary expenditure.08 Referees surveyed in the Brookings Institution
study of bankruptcy practices agreed that the committees are dominated by the attorneys, and a substantial minority believed committees
to be useless, or at least not worth the attorneys' fees paid. 61 Many
creditors polled by that study said that "a ring of bankruptcy lawyers"
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

(1971).

BANKR. L. REP. 62,907 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
Bankruptcy Act § 339(2), 11 U.S.C. § 739(2) (1970).
R. BANKR. P. 11-29(c).
Id. 11-31.
Ashe, supra note 58, at 263; Hertzberg, supra note 53, at 121.
D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS,

REFORM

136
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controlled Chapter proceedings despite the presence of creditors' committees, 70 and it is difficult to disagree.
The proposed Chapter VII substitutes a committee appointed by
the Administrator for the Chapter XI elected committee. 71 At a minimum this means -that someone will be cognizant of the composition
of the committee. The committee will include different types of creditors, "representative" of those holding claims. Additional committees
may be appointed by the Administrator sua sponte or upon order of the
court after a hearing on a complaint filed by a party in interest.72 Furthermore, any party in interest may apply to the court for a change
in the composition of any committee, on the ground that it is not representative. 73 It has been noted that this section is mined with litigationproducing provisions, to the extent it proves worthwhile to litigate. 4
The standard to be applied is vague in the extreme: membership must
be "representative."
The committee would still have extensive investigatory powers. 7
In fact, its functions under the proposed section generally track those
specified in Chapter XI. They are broadened in only two respects.
First, the committee is specifically required to consult with the Administrator on decisions in which it presently has no formal consultation
function: issuance of certificates of indebtedness, sale or lease of the
property of the debtor, and appointment of a trustee.70 Secondly, it
must consult with the trustee or debtor as to the operation of the business, 7 7 an area which at present is entirely within the formal control
of the court. 78 The committee is further empowered to "perform such
other services as may be in the interest of creditors. ' 0 Clearly, the
creditors' committee contemplated by Chapter VII will preserve a substantial amount of its former power despite the additional administra70. Id.
71. Proposed Act § 7-101 (a).
72. Id.§ 7-101(b).
73. Id.§ 7-101(c).
74. Weintraub & Levin, supra note 40.
75. Proposed Act § 7-101(d)(3)(C).
76. Id.§ 7-101(d)(3)(A).
77. Id.§ 7-101(d)(3)(B).
78. Bankruptcy Act § 343, 11 U.S.C. § 743 (1970); R. BANKR. P. 11-23.
79. Proposed Act § 7-101(d)(3)(H). This language may be contrasted with Bankruptcy Act § 339(1)(f), 11 U.S.C. § 739(1)(f) (1970), which restricted additional activities to "such other services as may contribute to the confirmation of the arrangement," although new rule 11-29(c), consistent with its allowance of compensation even
though a plan is not confirmed, uses the same language as proposed Chapter VII in this

regard.
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five layer of oversight provided. Are there checks to assure a more
effective and constructive use of that power in the proposed scheme?
The extent to which the present abuses will be corrected is not
clear. As noted, the attempt to make committees "representative" is
loaded with litigation potential. The provision precluding the attorney
for the committee from representing an individual creditor is also
aimed at balancing the influence of different types of creditors in the
proceeding, and to that extent corrects a present problem. However,
there is nothing in the Proposed Act to prevent continuing domination
of the committee by professionals, or to break up the real or perceived
ring of bankruptcy attorneys, and there is no specific supervision of,
or procedure for, calling to account and reviewing the work of the committee. It is, therefore, difficult to see why representation of the committee will become any more burdensome for the "professional" bankruptcy attorney and thus any less desirable as a source of an easy fee;
in his battle to represent the committee, he should have a potent new
weapon in his right to challenge, on "behalf' of his actual client, the
composition of the committee as nonrepresentative. Having won the
battle, however, he will have to relinquish representation of the creditor. Clearly, there will be sufficient incentive in many cases to
take advantage of the potential for litigation built into this standard.
There may be, however, somewhat greater quality control over
the creditors' committee's performance under proposed Chapter VII.
First, the addition to the statutory scheme of a full-time Administrator
to oversee the proceeding ought to result in closer attention to detail
than previously provided by the bankruptcy judge, although the Administrator lacks any specific statutory powers of oversight with respect
to the committee, except as to appointment. Secondly, proposed section 4-403(a)(8) permits an administrative claim against the debtor's
estate for
compensation for services, representing a substantial contribution
to a confirmed plan in a Chapter VII case, rendered by an attorney
or accountant to an indenture trustee, a creditor, an equity security
holder, or a committee representing creditors or equity security
holders not appointed pursuant to section 7-101. 80
In addition, proposed section 4-403 (a) (9) allows as an administration
claim expenses "representing a substantial contribution to a confirmed
plan in a Chapter VII case.

. .

80. Proposed Act § 4-403 (a) (8).

incurred by a creditor, equity security
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holder, or a committee representing creditors or equity security holders
not appointed pursuant to section 7-101." Thus, unlike the current
ineffectual backstop of the stockholders' derivative suit, the proposed
Chapter VII provides an incentive for close monitoring of the official
creditors' committee's performance by all sorts of potentially interested
parties, who can then anticipate a priority allowance from the estate for
their efforts. Obviously, this proposal has important downside risks:
so long as a good possibility of compensation exists, informal creditors'
committees can be expected to burst forth under Chapter VII. However, the draftsmen stopped short of allowances to any party in interest
who might equitably be entitled thereto; the provisions for reimbursement depend, as under pre-Chapter XI Bankruptcy Rules procedure,
on confirmation. Thus, while frivolous efforts will be discouraged, important contributions will go uncompensated, and, therefore, perhaps
unmade if confirmation will not clearly follow.
The balance reached by the Commission is dubious. Instead of
concentrating its proposals on assuring adequate performance by the
official committee, it holds out a carrot to other interested parties to
pick up whatever slack may be left, thereby opening up the coffers of
the debtor to im almost unlimited number of potential seekers of handouts, so long as a plan is ultimately confirmed. It is difficult to see
why additional powers of oversight or even control over the committee
given to the independent administrator could not have accomplished
the same result without turning the proceeding into a potential bonanza
for every involved individual and his attorney, giving such parties incentive to disagree or to refuse to compromise so that they can later
claim to have made a compensable contribution. In this respect the
Commission has carried over into Chapter VII one of the least desirable aspects of Chapter X. The result appears simply to multiply the
layers of bureaucracy without allaying the expense or assuring greater
efficiency in the performance of the official creditors' committee's duties, while at the same time multiplying the number of potential handouts from the estate. Under the proposal, the Administrator has authority to add to the committee. If to this procedure were added a
supervisory role and impeachment process, overseen by the bankruptcy
court, greater efficiency could be achieved without expanding the
number of potential recipients of the estate's largesse.
Another area related to the duties of the creditors' committee
where the ideal of speed and economy often gives way to a reality of
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abuse is the evaluation of the proposed plan and the solicitation of acceptances thereto."' If the debtor is controlling the flow of information, it is inevitable that the creditors' committee will be ill-equipped
to appraise the debtor's proposed plan unless it is prepared to ask the
hard questions, demand the documentation, and possibly do a substantial amount of investigation.
The court's perspective may also suffer
from the slanted information it may be receiving.
In Chapter X the preliminary order of approval by the judge
represents a disinterested evaluation of the plan before acceptances can
be solicited from creditors and, where appropriate, stockholders.8 3 In
the interest of speed and economy, however, prior approval is not part
of the Chapter XI scheme, and acceptances are solicited with no monitoring from the court. Indeed, acceptances may be solicited before the
petition is even filed, and, if so, there is nothing in Chapter XI to prevent the plan from being confirmed as early as the first meeting of
creditors.
This is not to say that there are no protections available. One
of the prerequisite findings to confirmation of a plan, if objection is
made, is that "the proposal and its acceptance are in good faith and
have not been made or procured by any means, promises or acts forbidden by this Act. ' 8 4 Chapter XI courts also have the less drastic
power to void acceptances for confusing and misleading solicitation. 5
Evidence of misleading solicitation has also resulted in transfers
to Chapter X, where, for example, a "Debenture Holders' Protective
Committee" sent out inaccurate and misleading letters recommending
acceptance of a plan.86 Where acceptances to a plan were solicited
81. The functions of a creditors' committee may include: "(c) to negotiate
with the debtor concerning the terms of the proposed arrangement and to advise the
creditors of its recommendations with respect thereto; (d) to report to the creditors from
time to time concerning the progress of the proceeding; (e) to collect and file with the
court acceptances of the arrangement proposed.

.

. "

Bankruptcy Act H§ 339(1) (c)-

(e), 11 U.S.C. H8 739(1)(c)-(e) (1970). SeealsoR. BANKR. P. 11-29(a).
82. Again, prior to the effective date (July 1, 1974) of the new rules for Chapter
XI, the committee and its agents had a substantial stake in not examining the plan too
closely if that would mean a recommendation of rejection. See text accompanying notes
60-62 supra.
83. Bankruptcy Act H§ 171-76, 11 U.S.C. §§ 571-76 (1970); R. BAMnK. P. 10-303
to -304.
84. Bankruptcy Act § 366(4), 11 U.S.C. § 766 (1970). If no objection is made,
however, this finding may be made by the court without taking proof. R. BANKR. P.
11-38(d).
85. SEC v. Crumpton Builders, Inc., 337 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1964).
86. SEC v. Liberty Baking Corp., 240 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
930 (1957).
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pursuant to a debtor's statement that the only alternative thereto was
liquidation, the court transferred the proceedings to Chapter X because acceptances were virtually coerced.8 7 These cases offer some
indication that a court is not powerless to act and may itself subject
the plan and acceptances to scrutiny, even when the creditors' committee has abdicated its role as chief watchdog. However, the bluntness
of the threats available to the court, i.e. forcing the debtor into Chapter
X or into ordinary bankruptcy, points up the dilemma faced when
everybody benefits from a successful Chapter XI only if everyone acts
responsibly therein. Attaining responsible behavior is the crux of the
difficulty. The draconian alternatives available to the bankruptcy court
for more than minor isolated misbehavior in the Chapter XI will typically benefit nobody.
Proposed Chapter VII continues the unsupervised solicitation of
acceptances only for plans not affecting "publicly held securities," as that
term is defined.8 18 This is the relatively small group of debtors for
whom Chapter X-type composition plans will continue under very
limited circumstances to be specifically available under Chapter VII.8
However, because the provisions contemplate a representative creditors'
committee, abl& to obtain compensation for expenses of employing experts other than attorneys and accountants to evaluate the plan,90 there
is some greater likelihood that the plan will be properly appraised before acceptances are solicited. The requirement that such a plan be
unanimously accepted by all affected creditors further helps to guarantee appropriate appraisal; a single dissenter would seem to preclude
confirmation of a plan of this type.' For all other types of debtors
and plans, the Chapter X approach of judicial and administrative supervision of solicitation of acceptances, after judicial approval of the plan,
is followed in these proceedings. 92 Of course, the Chapter VII court
would still be empowered to examine the acceptances of the plan for
good faith issues. 93 In summary, the net effect here is to continue the
existing Chapter XE procedures for soliciting acceptances in the severely limited number of cases where composition plans will specifi87. Norman Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. SEC, 415 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1969).
88. Proposed Act §§ 7-307 to -308. "Publicly held securities" is defined to mean
"securities of a class the ownership of which is held of record by three hundred or more
persons." Id. § 1-102(36).
89. See text accompanying notes 182-83 infra.
90. Proposed Act § 7-101(d) (1).
91. See text accompanying notes 182-89 infra.
92. Proposed Act §§ 7-306, -308.
93. Id. § 7-309(e).
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cally be permitted. In all other cases, where the fairness of the plan
will be measured pursuant to an ostensibly different standard, solicitation of acceptances will be closely regulated. Clearly, then, the abuses
with respect to solicitation will have been cured for the most part in
the Proposed Act. The question as to whether rigidity has unnecessarily replaced flexibility with respect to the ultimate purpose for the
solicitation, the confirmation of a plan, will be discussed below.
Close attention to a plan's provisions before it is confirmed, and
to the fair solicitation of acceptances, avails nothing when the creditors
in question, upon the debtor's post-confirmation default in the performance of the plan's terms, are left without a summary remedy. This
occurs when the plan does not provide that the bankruptcy court retain
jurisdiction over the debtor,9 4 and, unfortunately, it is the rare plan that
does so provide. The Brookings Institution study found that, in general, bankruptcy judges oppose the retention of jurisdiction.9 5 They
believe that the debtor is better able to conduct its business without
interference by the court, and they are under pressure from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to close cases.
The considerations are not all one-sided, as provision for the retention of jurisdiction may benefit the debtor. For example, only
where there has been such a retention of jurisdiction may an extension
plan be altered or modified after confirmation.9 6 On the other hand,
retained jurisdiction enables creditors to invoke the authority of the
bankruptcy court to enforce a deferred payment plan on which the debtor has defaulted. There are many salutary examples in the case law.
In Grayson-Robinson Stores17 the court was to retain jurisdiction for
a predicted eleven years until all the payments had been made to creditors. The referee in Wilcox-Gay9 s retained jurisdiction so that evidence of debtor irregularities could be brought to his attention. Such
retentions of jurisdiction can only increase the efficiency of the reorganization process. The reluctance on the part of debtors and courts
to include such a provision is at least partially responsible for the
Brookings Institution's finding that so few Chapter X debtors remain
94. Bankruptcy Act § 368, 11 U.S.C. § 768 (1970) provides that the court "shall
retain jurisdiction, if so provided in the arrangement" (emphasis added). Otherwise, the
court retains jurisdiction for the very limited purpose of disposing of claims which have
not been allowed or disallowed prior to confirmation. Id. § 369, 11 U.S.C. § 769.
95. D. STANLEY &M. GimRH, supra note 69, at 144.
96. Bankruptcy Act § 363, 11 U.S.C. § 763 (1970).
97. Grayson-Robinson Stores v. SEC, 320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963).
98. In re Wilcox-Gay Corp., 133 F. Supp. 548 (W.D. Mich. 1955), aff'd sub nom.
SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956).
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in operation very long after the confirmation of a planY0 This fact was
recognized by the draftsmen of Chapter VII. The proposed provisions
would allow modifications to be suggested by any party in interest if
the Administrator permits.1 00 If the plan has been substantially consummated, no modification can be obtained unless no creditor or equity
securities holder is materially and adversely affected. 1 0 ' Rather than
requiring a Chapter VII plan to include a provision for retention of
jurisdiction, the intention is that specific performance of a plan may
be sought at any time by a party in interest.1 02 No longer will a debtor
be able to ignore with impunity his obligations under the plan once confirmation has occurred. Jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to enforce
the terms thereof will remain available to any party seeking it for the
course of the plan.

IlI.

DOES PROPOSED CHAPTER VII RETAIN THE
ADVANTAGEOUS ASPECTS OF CHAPTER XI?

Legitimate preferences for current Chapter XI revolve around its
design for speed and economy in the confirmation and consummation
of a plan. The Brookings Institution study found that a typical proceeding under Chapter XI lasts one and one-half years, which is the
durational equivalent of a straight bankruptcy proceeding, while a
Chapter X reorganization may take five years or longer to be fully consummated., 3 Accordingly, it would be helpful to pinpoint the delays
inherent in current Chapter X which are absent from Chapter XI and
to see which of those delays reappear in proposed Chapter VII.
The Brookings Institution study cites distribution as one of the
chief sources of delay under Chapter X. 10 4 Although distribution may
begin upon consummation of a plan, 10 5 obtaining proofs of claim and
acceptances from widely scattered creditors and stockholders is quite
time-consuming. Also, the statute provides for a period of at least five
years during which assets must be kept available to pay creditors and
security holders as they surrender their claims. 08 Only after that time
99. The study found that only one-third of the Chapter XI debtors are still in operation two years after the proceedings have closed. D. SrANLEY & M. GiRTH, supra
note 69, at 115.
100. Proposed Act § 7-305(a).
101. Id. § 7-305(b).
102. Id. § 7-303, Advisory Comm. Note 2.
103. D. SrALEY & M. GimRT, supra note 69, at 143-45.
104. Id. at 145.
105. Bankruptcy Act § 224(4), 11 U.S.C. § 624(4) (1970).
106. Id. § 204, 11 U.S.C. § 604; R. B'Ah . P. 10-405(b).
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has expired do the unclaimed assets revert to the corporation. 07' Chapter XI, in contrast, lacks a section on surrender of claims in connection
with distribution to all creditors whose proofs of claim have been allowed in the proceeding. Proposed Chapter VII continues the necessity for a period for surrender if it is required by the plan,0 8 but sets
five years as the outside limit rather than the minimum period.1
Another aspect of Chapter X which causes delay is the number
of required formal hearings with notice to all parties. Hearings on the
approval of the petition and the appointment of the trustee,10 9 and for
judicial approval of the plan before creditor approval, 110 are both absent under Chapter XI. Proposed Chapter VII would carry over both
of these hearings in most instances."' Furthermore, while many administrative decisions under both chapters require approval of the
court, after hearing on notice to all parties in interest, the Chapter XI
Rules provide that certain of those hearings may be held upon notice
only to the creditors' committee, unless another party in interest spe-2
cifically files a request with the court that he receive personal notice."
Accordingly, it is frequently possible to obtain the consent of the single
creditors' committee, often through its attorney, to take the proposed
action with the consent of the court forthcoming without a formal hearing. Since the proposed Chapter VII procedure in general more
closely resembles present Chapter X, it can be expected that the typical
case will have many more hearings than the current Chapter XI case.
There are many additional bottlenecks or possible bottlenecks in
Chapter X which do not exist in Chapter X: (1) the requirement
of court approval of a petition as being proper and in good faith;"13
(2) the trustee's investigatory report;" 4 (3) the SEC's advisory report; 115 (4) the court order approving the plan as a prerequisite to
soliciting acceptances;" x6 and (5) the requirement of creditor, and in
some instances stockholder, acceptance by two-thirds in amount of
claims of each class affected." 7 Delay may also inhere in the require107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Bankruptcy Act § 205, 11 U.S.C. § 605 (1970); P. BANKR. P. 10-406(b).
Proposed Act § 7-312(c).
Bankruptcy Act § 161, 11 U.S.C. § 561 (1970); R. BANR. P. 10-212.
Bankruptcy Act § 169, 11 U.S.C. § 569 (1970); R. BANKR. P. 10-303.
Proposed Act § 7-102(a), -306(a).
R. BANKR. P. 11-24(d).
Bankruptcy Act § 141-44, 11 U.S.C. § 541-44; R. BANKR. P. 10-113.
Bankruptcy Act § 167, 11 U.S.C. § 567 (1970); R. BANKR. P. 10-208.
Bankruptcy Act H9 172-73, 11 U.S.C. §§ 572-73 (1970); R. BA1iM. P. 10-303.
Bankruptcy Act § 176, 11 U.S.C. § 576 (1970); R. BANKR. P. 10-303 to -304.
Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1970); R. BANKr. P. 10-305.
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ments that the "judge" (defined to exclude the referee in bankruptcy1 18) perform certain functions in Chapter X which may be carried out by the "court" (the judge or referee 10" ) in Chapter XI. These
functions include authorizing the issuance of certificates of indebtedness,1 20 permitting the rejection of executory contracts, 12 ' and authoriz22
ing the lease or sale of property.1
Under Chapter VII the aforementioned duties of judge or court
would be vested in the Administrator, except that the court (defined
as a "bankruptcy court or a judge of a bankruptcy court' 23) must authorize any proposed sale or lease which would transfer all or substantially all of the debtor's property. 124 Confirmation is, however, made
easier because, as under current Chapter XI, only a majority in amount
rather than two-thirds acceptance by each affected class of creditors
and stockholders is required. 25 If the Bankruptcy Administration itself operates quickly, the procedure will be improved by the elimination of the need for a court's authorization of some routine steps of
a proceeding. Unfortunately, it is contrary to historical precedent to
suppose that an administrative bureaucracy will act with deliberate
speed; if it does so, however, everyone stands to benefit from what will
then constitute reasonably streamlined procedures. Greater supervision may then actually exist without accompanying unacceptable delays.
In addition to being far faster, Chapter XI is far less expensive
than Chapter X. In fact, average costs in Chapter XI are below those
of straight bankruptcy. 2 6 The monies available for a decent settlement in Chapter XI would often be entirely consumed in the course of
a Chapter X proceeding in paying for a trustee, an investigation, and
7
a trustee's report, etc.' 2
As noted, Chapter XI allows compensation to agents, attorneys,
and accountants of only one creditors' committee, 28 and compensates
118. Bankruptcy Act § 1(20), 11 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970); R. BANKR. P.902(4).
119. Bankruptcy Act § 1(9), 11 U.S.C. § 1(9) (1970).
120. Id.H3 116(2), 344, 11 U.S.C. § 516(2), 744.
121. Id.§§ 116(1), 313(1), 11 U.S.C. §§ 516(1), 713(1); R. BANR. P.11-53.
122. Bankruptcy Act H3 116(3), 313(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 516(3), 713(2) (1970); R.
BNm.
P.11-54(b).
123. Proposed Act § 1-102(14).

124. Id.§ 7-205.

125. Id.§ 7-310(d)(1).
126. D. STANLEY & M. Gmu-, supra note 69, at 177-78.
127. See, e.g., In re Lea Fabrics, Inc., 272 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), vacated as moot
sub nom. SEC v. Lea Fabrics, Inc., 363 U.S. 417 (1960).
128. Bankruptcy Act § 339(2), 11 U.S.C. § 739(2) (1970); R. BANXR. P. 11-29(b).
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the disbursing agent if one is needed. 29 In addition, only one reasonable fee for the debtor's attorneys is permitted.' 30 This is to be compared with Chapter X, under which reimbursement is forthcoming for
expenses of petitioning creditors, for services of the referee acting as
special master, for the trustee and other officers and their attorneys, for the debtor's attorney and the attorney for petitioning
creditors, for committees or representatives of creditors and stockholders and their attorneys or agents, and for any other parties in interest
and their attorneys or agents.' 3 ' In addition, expenses and services
rendered in connection with suggestions for a plan which is ultimately
confirmed, objections to a plan which is ultimately rejected, or contributions to administration which are beneficial to the estate may be allowed to creditors, stockholders and their attorneys.' 32
Proposed Chapter VII provides for reimbursement of necessary
and reasonable services rendered by an attorney or accountant to a
number of entities, expenses and services of a trustee, expenses of the
Administrator and any creditors' committee, and expenses for services
of any parties in interest (their attorneys and accountants) which
represent "a substantial contribution to a confirmed plan."' 33 Clearly
Chapter VII is nowhere near as penny-pinching as Chapter XI, but its
potential price tag to the particular estate cannot be evaluated without
knowing how many unofficial creditors' committees are likely to be
formed, how many compensable contributions to a plan are likely to
be made and how those contributions are to be valued, how frequently
a trustee will be appointed, and how much expense the Administrator
will incur in carrying out his duties.
Lack of disruption of the operation of the business in most Chapter XI proceedings has already been mentioned as a primary advantage
of that type of proceeding.' 34 Retention of management is often insisted upon by creditors, and this insistence has accounted for court decisions to keep debtors in Chapter XI despite objections.'3 5 One commentator has appraised the situation in this way:
Creditors are much more likely to ascribe the debtor's troubles
to a combination of bad luck and ineptness, rather than dishonesty
129. Bankruptcy Act § 337(1), 11 U.S.C. § 737(1) (1970); R. BANKR. P. 11-38(a).
130. Bankruptcy Act §§ 64a(1), 302, 11 U.S.C. §§ 104a(1), 702 (1970); R. BANKR.
P. 219, 11-31.
131. Bankruptcy Act §§ 241-42, 11 U.S.C. §§ 641-42 (1970); R. BANKR. P. 10-215.
132. Bankruptcy Act § 243, 11 U.S.C. § 643 (1970); R. BANxK.. P. 10-215.
133. Proposed Act §§ 4-403(a) (3)-(10).
134. See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
135. E.g., In re KDI Corp., 477 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1973).
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of management. They are not always ready to believe that a disinterested trustee will necessarily prove less inept than the management
he replaces, particularly while he is acquiring on-the-job training at
their expense. They will often prefer to persuade the management
should be supplemented, and less often replaced, by new
that it 36
blood.'
Indeed, creditors have threatened to boycott any plans which call for
the dismissal of current management. 137 The self-interest of trade
creditors is better served by retaining current customers than by allowing new management, which may not make further purchases from
these creditors, to be installed. This is clearly a prime area in which
the interests of various classes of creditors may diverge.
In addition, consistency of management may be a prerequisite to
retaining key employees "who would not remain through a lengthy
Chapter X proceeding because of their lack of confidence in a trustee
unknown to them and their fears that suppliers would cut off merchandise."1381 Indeed, creditors often refuse to ship on credit to a business
run by a Chapter X trustee whereas they will continue such shipments
to a debtor in possession under Chapter X. 139
As noted, proposed Chapter VJI would permit the appointment
of a current manager of the business as a second, non-disinterested
trustee to continue operations, 40 an action that may help maintain
creditor confidence for the duration of the reorganizaton proceeding.
Furthermore, to the extent that the new version of the absolute priority
rule in Chapter VII will permit the future contributions of management
to be recognized in the allocation of securities in the reorganized enterprise,' - ' this limited continuity may appear more meaningful to suppliers, since it will be seen as most likely continuing after consummation
of the proceeding.
136. Coogan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Questions for the NonBankruptcy Business Lawyer, 29 Bus. LAw. 729, 743 (1974).
137. In re Wilcox-Gay Corp., 133 F. Supp. 548 (W.D. Mich. 1955), af 'd sub nom.
SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956).
138. See Grayson-Robinson Stores v. SEC, 320 F.2d 940, 946 (2d Cir. 1963).
139. See id. Such a refusal sabotaged a plan after the proceedings were switched
from Chapter XI to Chapter X in In re Davega Stores Corp., BANKR. L. REP. 60,434
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also In re Arlan's Dep't Stores, 373 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), where a transfer to Chapter X was granted even though Judge Carter acknowledged "the serious possibility that the debtor's line of credit will be substantially extinguished under Chapter X." Id. at 526. He went on to state, "I regret that people
in the trade may wrongly construe a proceeding in Chapter X to be the harbinger of
bankruptcy and liquidation." Id.
140. Proposed Act § 7-102(d). See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 196-201 infra.
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Another aspect of the continuity provided by the continuation of
management in Chapter XI is the possibility of continuing 'an earlier
attempt at out-of-court agreement with creditors to enter a Chapter
XI proceeding with a minimum of disruption.
The continuity of dealing with a debtor from the time he becomes
insolvent until his problems are consummated in a settlement did
not stop when the composition settlement failed to obtain sufficient
acceptances, but continued into the Chapter XI proceedings withof negotiations, which may have been
out loss of -time or disruption
1 42
months in the making.
Chapter XI limits the proposal of a plan to the debtor. 1 43 This monopoly, coupled with the possibility of soliciting acceptances even before
the filing of the petition, 144 gives the debtor the ability to continue an
unsuccessful out-of-court arrangement plan into Chapter XI and to
have it accepted without delay. The ability to solicit acceptances prior
to the approval of the plan is intimately related to this advantage. To
the extent that the solicitation is no longer permitted, this valuable continuity is lost.
Furthermore, because involuntary petitions would be authorized
in Chapter VII proceedings, the debtor is given less room to propose
an out-of-court settlement, line up acceptances, terminate the composition effort, and file both plan and acceptances. A disgruntled major
creditor could affect the timing of the initiation of the Chapter VII proceedings by filing an involuntary petition before the out-of-court effort
had progressed very far.145 Moreover, under Chapter VII, the debtor
must relinquish his exclusive authority to propose a plan. 46 This
loosening of debtor control will undoubtedly lessen his ability to put
through a prior extrajudicial plan. Creditors will no longer be faced
with the sole alternative of applying for an order of liquidation (or,
perhaps in some cases, filing an involuntary Chapter X petition) when
they do not wish to approve a debtor's proposal.' 47 Under Chapter
VII, the mechanism for continuing an out-of-court settlement attempt
into an arrangement proceeding with little dislocation is substantially
142.
143.
144.
145.

Weintraub & Levin, supra note 40, at 20.
Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970).
Id. § 336(4), 11 U.S.C. § 736(4); R. BANK. P. 11-37(a).
Proposed Act § 4-205(d).

146. Id. § 7-304(b).
147. This is the other side of the argument made earlier that the lack of flexibility
of remedy serves to promote debtor misbehavior. Here, the same inflexibility improves
good faith attempts at informal settlement. Far from being inconsistent, the two points
underscore both the genius of Chapter XI and its basic flaw with respect to its assump-

tions about human nature and responsible behavior in a basically unsupervised setting.
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weakened. To the extent that the overall scheme hinders rather than
encourages informal settlement attempts, its approach may be seriously
questioned.
In Chapter XI, the creditors' committee is another means of linking extrajudicial proceedings with those under the Bankruptcy Act.
Under the present scheme, expenses incurred by a committee before
its official election are allowed as long as a majority of the prefiling
committee is retained. 148 If substantially equivalent creditors' committees indeed exist out of court and in Chapter XI, the debtor and his
creditors reap the benefits of a continuing relationship. 149 This continuity is jeopardized by the device of the appointment of the creditors'
committee by the Administrator in proposed Chapter VII.'5 0 Unless
the out-of-court committee was representative of different sorts of
claims and was composed of creditors holding the largest amount of
claims, it cannot be carried over unchanged. If the Administrator
chooses not to appoint substantially the same committee, the only
remedy is appeal to the court on the ground that the appointed committee is unrepresentative, an appeal that, under the given standards, is
almost sure to fail.
An additional area of flexibility promoting confirmation of Chapter XI plans is the classification of creditors. Whereas all classifications
in Chapter X are made by the judge,' 5 ' the debtor himself may classify
creditors as part of his proposed Chapter XI arrangement, 52 subject
5
to summary classification by the court in the event of controversy. ;
After division into classes, creditors may be treated unequally by the
plan,'54 but arbitrary classifications are prohibited. 55 Grouping creditors so that each class contains a majority likely to accept the plan is
not precluded as long as some reasonable basis for such division can
148. Bankruptcy Act § 339(2), 11 U.S.C. § 739(2) (1970); R. BANKR. P. 11-29.
149. The assumption here is that the creditors' committee in question does not exhibit a large number of the common flaws discussed supra, and therefore does serve a
useful function.
150. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
151. Bankruptcy Act § 197, 11 U.S.C. § 597 (1970); R. BANKR. P. 10-302.
152. Bankruptcy Act § 351(1), 11 U.S.C. § 757(1) (1970).
153. Id. § 351, 11 U.S.C. § 751.
154. See S. KRAusE, ARRANGEMENTS UNDER CHAPTER XI OF THE BANKRUPTCY AcT
116 (1968).
155. In re Discon Corp., 346 F. Supp. 839, 841 (S.D. Fla. 1971); lit re Manufacturers' Credit Corp., 278 F. Supp. 384 (D.N.J.), aff'd sub nom. Manufacturers' Credit
Corp. v. SEC, 395 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1968) (classification of creditors according to dates
prior to which they had advanced money found arbitrary).
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be shown.150 Since creditor acceptance of the plan is the goal, the deb-

tor must guard against the danger that creditors will so resent the classification imposed on them that they will impede acceptance of the arrangement. 1 1 7 Within these confines, the power to classify creditors
strengthens the debtor's position in Chapter XI proceedings.
The Proposed Act would place this power in the hands of the Ad-

ministrator, to be exercised on request of a party in interest. Explicit
guidelines are provided for such classification: the class must be "of
substantially similar character and the members [must] enjoy substantially similar rights."'", While the meaning of this test (and particularly whether that meaning differs from the present test of rationality) will have to await administrative and judicial interpretation, there
appears to be less opportunity for political gerrymandering based upon
a perceived likelihood of acceptance of the plan. If the creditors themselves accept such gerrymandering as in their best interests, it is ques-

tionable whether inflexible prevention of such activity will promote any
overriding public interest.' 59
The ultimate scope of the plan in current Chapters X and XI is

limited by the standards under each chapter for confirmation. While
a plan under Chapter X must be "fair and equitable,"' 10 that is, comply

with the absolute priority principles laid down by the Supreme Court
in the progeny of Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Boyd, 16 ' a

Chapter XI plan need only be "for the best interests of creditors."' 62
Since an arrangement under Chapter XI cannot affect secured creditors, 0 3 it is clear that the creditors referred to in this rubric are the

unsecured creditors who can be affected. Definitions of this term of
156. See Rostow & Cutler, Competing Systems of Reorganization: Chapters X and
XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334 (1939).
157. See-Hertzberg, supra note 53, at 118.
158. Proposed Act § 7-302.
159. See, e.g., Bartle v. Markson Bros., Inc., 314 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1963).
160. Bankruptcy Act §§ 174, 221(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 574, 621(2) (1970).
161. 228 U.S. 482 (1913). The progeny include Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v.
Manufacturer's Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942) (Chapter X); Consolidated Rock Prods.
Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941) (the last two under Bankruptcy Act of 1934, ch.
424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 912); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106
(1939); Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445 (1926).
Essentially, the absolute priority doctrine requires that each class of creditors, in order
of seniority, must receive the "indubitable equivalence" of full compensation upon its
claims pursuant to the plan before the next junior class of creditors is entitled to receive
anything at all upon its claims, and all creditors must be so compensated before equity
holders can receive anything. See In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d
Cir. 1935).
162. Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1970).
163. Id. §§ 356, 357(1), 11 U.S.C. §§ 756, 757(1).
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art vary slightly. All courts agree that the requirement is not satisfied
if unsecured creditors would receive more from liquidation than from
the plan.6 4 Some courts deem a plan to be for the best interests of
creditors if it will provide as much as liquidation; equivalency is the
test.165 Others heighten the standard by insisting that the plan yield
more to creditors than they could expect from liquidation. 66 In any
event, it is clear that the relevant comparison is to the expected returns
from a bankruptcy liquidation. A plan does not have to be generous
in its payment to creditors to be in their best interests. Plans have
107
been confirmed that pay creditors a mere one percent of their claims.
Whatever the precise outer limits, it is clear that the test, unlike the
standards for confirmation in Chapter X, permits a substantial range
of bargaining between the debtor and the affected unsecured creditors
about who-the unsecured creditors or the equity holders-will reap the
benefit of the going-concern value of the enterprise that is preserved
through rehabilitation in lieu of liquidation. Where public policy would
not permit this good will factor to redound to the benefit of equity holders (because, for example, of the existence of a substantial number of
public creditors plus a judgment that continuation of present management is not crucial to future success) Chapter X is the appropriate vehicle for corporate rehabilitation. Where this is not the case, however,
Chapter XI standards of confirmation permit creditors, on a pragmatic
and interested basis, to decide how much it is worth to them to see
the debtor remain in business. They may decide for themselves how
much of the maximum conceivable recovery, as measured by the application of the absolute priority standard, they will permit to redound to
the equity holders and, thereby, generally to be shared by management.
At the same time, management is free to decide at what point the
effort to rehabilitate is not worth the candle because creditors are demanding too much of that going-concern value; if creditors are dissatisfied with management's decision in this regard, they have the option
of filing an involuntary Chapter X petition. The range of negotiation
permitted by the flexible standard thus permits an accord on mutually
164. Technical Color & Chem. Works, Inc. v. Two Guys from Massapequa, Inc.,
327 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1964); 9 W. COLLIER, supra note 45, %9.17, at 282.
165. In re Village Men's Shops, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Ind. 1960); Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of Creditorsor Stockholders?, 21
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 540 (1973).
166. In re Peoples Loan & Inv. Co., 410 F.2d 851, 857 n.6 (8th Cir. 1969); In re
Discon Corp., 346 F. Supp. 839, 841 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
167. In re Halperin, [1962-1966 Transfer Binder] BANR. L. REP.
60,737, at
69,155 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
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agreeable terms. When there is no substantial "public interest" to prevent a deal from being struck, in light of the self-interest of the negotiators on each side, a minimum of supervision and minimum standards
for confirmation best serve all relevant interests. This process may be
favorably contrasted with the Chapter X process, in which the absolute
priority rule limits the range of negotiation to the type of capital structure and amount of senior securities which will be issued by the reorganized corporation. Of course, bargaining even in that area. is limited
by notions of "feasibility."' 168 To the extent negotiation about distribution of going-concern value does take place, it must be disguised in
terms of enterprise value.
The proposed Bankruptcy Act eliminates the "best interests of
creditors" test from its standards for confirmation. 6 9 Even the provision on conversion of the proceeding to one for liquidation does not
look to comparative yields between liquidation and a Chapter V11
plan. 7 0 Instead, all Chapter VII plans, with the single exception mentioned, must be tested against a modified absolute priority rule.
T
A second Chapter XI standard for confirmation is "feasibility.'' 7
"Feasibility" is also a prerequisite to confirmation of a Chapter X
plan. 72 However, substantial authority exists for the proposition that
different standards attach to the determination of this element in the
different chapters. While Chapter X feasibility is typically said to involve "the question of the emergence of the reorganized debtor in a
solvent condition and with reasonable prospects of financial stability
and success,"'1 73 the test for Chapter XI is "whether the things which
are to be done after confirmation can be done as a practical matter
under the facts.' 7 4
This looser standard in Chapter XI has not been universally applauded. The Brookings Institution study points to the lack of attention to potential success of the business under the plan, as opposed to
the success of the business in fulfilling the terms of the plan, as a main
reason why only one-third of Chapter XI debtors are still in operation
two years after the proceedings have closed.' 7 5 Despite the negative
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See text accompanying notes 171-77 infra.
Proposed Act § 7-310.
Id. § 7-112.
Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2).
Id.§§ 174, 221(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 574, 621(2).
6A W. COLLIER, supra note 45, 11.07, at 638.
9 id. 1 9.18, at 287.
D. STANLEY & M. Gm.TH, supranote 69, at 146.
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slant placed thereon by that study, this definition of feasibility seems
entirely appropriate, in light of the limited purposes of a Chapter XI
arrangement. The typical rubric is "the probability of actual performance" of the arrangement.' 7 6 Thus, within such a definition, a single
payment plan for which the cash is already deposited is, without further
inquiry, "feasible" even if the corporation collapses on the following
day.17 7 The alternative of liquidation would have provided less for
creditors since, presumably, the "best interests" standard had been
satisfied.
The Brookings Institution, however, has not been alone in criticizing this standard, and some courts have applied a definition of feasibility for Chapter XI which is virtually identical to that applied for
Chapter X. Judge Medina, in In re Transvision, Inc.,118 outlined the
question involved in the feasibility test of Chapter XI as follows: Is
there "a reasonable likelihood that the desired financial recovery will
be effected without unduly prejudicing the rights of any interested parties"? 179 The Sixth Circuit affirmed a lower court's decision which
used "feasibility" to mean a reasonable likelihood that confirmation of
the plan will lead to financial recovery. 80 In another proceeding, an
arrangement was not confirmed because there was insufficient evidence regarding the chance of financial success under the plan.''
There is no question but that the intention of the draftsmen of
proposed Chapter VII was to adopt the Chapter X, and not the Chapter
XI, notion of "feasibility" for all corporate reorganizations. Note 8 to
proposed section 7-310 specifically states that it is "abandoning the judicial interpretation of 'feasibility'" for Chapter XI, which it characterizes as "the ability to meet plan requirements." Rather, proposed
section 7-310(d) (2) (A) will require probability of financial success,
and, accordingly, explicitly states that the plan must be "not likely to
176. In re KDI Corp., 477 F.2d 726, 733 (6th Cir. 1973); In re Village Men's
Shops, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D. Ind. 1960). Even under this definition the
debtor is not required to reveal in the plan the source of funds needed for consummation
thereof, nor even allege that it has access to such funds. In re Gefke, BANKR. L. REP.
65,397 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
177. See In re Slumberland Bedding Co., 115 F. Supp. 39 (D. Md. 1953).
178. 217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955).
179. Id. at 246; accord, United Properties, Inc. v. Emporium Dep't Stores, 379 F.2d
55, 65 (8th Cir. 1967).
180. In re Wilcox-Gay Corp., 133 F. Supp. 548 (W.D. Mich. 1955), al'd sub nom.
SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956).
181. In re Deters, BANKn. L. REP. 1 63,231 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
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be followed by the liquidation of, or a need for further financial reorganization by, the debtor or any successor under the plan."
It is suggested that, so long as the standard for confirmation of
a Chapter XI plan is the "best interests of creditors," the looser meaning of "feasibility" is consistent with the purposes of that Chapter. Assuming that the Chapter X standard of feasibility is not met in any particular case, and the rehabilitated corporation again meets with failure,
the unsecured creditors will at worst receive more than they would
have upon the immediate liquidation of the debtor. At best, of course,
the corporation will be successfully rehabilitated, and, between these
two extremes, many other parties will likely benefit from delayed liquidation.
But, as noted, the best interests of creditors will no longer be the
test, and it is here that most vestiges of Chapter XI plans may disappear. For in applying a variation of current Chapter X standards"fair and equitable" and "feasible"-to virtually all corporate rehabilitation efforts, the draftsmen seem to have made a policy decision that
the potential abuses of Chapter XI in its current form outweigh its potential utility. To be sure, certain very limited possibilities for composition specifically remain. When a plan does not materially and adversely affect the claims or interests of holders of publicly held securities (defined as "securities of a class the ownership of which is held of
record by three hundred or more persons""8 2 ), the "fair and equitable"
finding need not be made if the court finds that the plan has "been
knowingly and voluntarily accepted by all creditors and equity security
holders materially and adversely affected by it after full disclosure."183
One prominent commentator has argued that the unanimity in question
is a majority acceptance by each class of accepted claims, rather than
by every member of every class.18 4 While the Commission Report itself is ambiguous as to what was intended,' 85 the language and context
182. Proposed Act § 1-102(36).
183. ld. § 7-310(d)(2)(B).
184. Coogan, supra note 136, at 752.
185. At stake is who gets the difference between the liquidation value and the
going concern value of a corporation. Should the statute permit the creditors
themselves to decide by a majority vote? There is merit to the proposition
that the creditors, if they are small in number and sophisticated, should be
permitted to bargain out this issue of allocation of the going concern bonus
with the debtor. This once was the law in equity receivership reorganizations,
but it was subject to abuse, and judicial control was imposed by the Supreme Court in Boyd. Such judicial control is still needed, but the need for
flexibility should also be recognized.
1 CoMmissloN REPORT, supra note 1, at 259. See Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act:
Changes in the Absolute PriorityRule for CorporateReorganizations, 87 HARv. L. REv.
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seem to require complete unanimity; the draftsmen had no trouble requiring approval by a majority of each class when that is what they intended.""6 The "majority of each class" reading reduces to the proposition that, so long as there is no issue of unsecured debt in the hands
of 300 or more members of the public, Chapter XI compositions could
continue absolutely unabated, albeit unaided by the "cramdown" provisions of Chapter X which will be continued in Chapter VII.18 7 This
would follow at least to the extent that a composition plan "does not
materially and adversely affect the claims or interests" of public stockholders. 8 Thus, rather than carving out a narrow exception for application of the modified absolute priority rule, the draftsmen, on this
view, have forged a narrow exception where the fair and equitable
standard must be applied. In other words, Chapter XI-type composi-

tions are the order of the day, except where there is an unsecured debt
issue held by more than 300 members of the public. If that is what
the draftsmen intended, they certainly obfuscated the issue by treating
the exception as the rule. Accordingly, this reading is rejected herein,
and it is assumed that only absolute unanimity of all affected creditors,
and no public debt issue, meets the specific statutory exemption for
confirmation of a composition plan.18 9
In all other cases under Chapter VII, the "fair and equitable"
standard, as it is redefined in section 310(d)(2)(B), must be met. To
be sure, the rule is restated and ostensibly loosened from the currently
1786, 1809 (1974), arguing for the unanimity requirement in order to narrow the instances in which there would be no court review of fairness. Otherwise, the author
claims, the determination that acceptances were made in good faith, Proposed Act § 7310(d) (2)(C), would become all important and would not provide sufficient protection.
186. See Proposed Act § 7-310(d)(1):
(d) Confirmation.-The court shall confirm a plan if-(1) it is accepted by a
majority in amount of the creditors of each class materially and adversely
affected who have accepted or rejected the plan and, if the debtor is not
insolvent, by the holders of a majority in number of the equity securities of
each class materially and adversely affected who have accepted or rejected the
plan ....

187. See text accompanying note 235 infra.
188. Proposed Act § 7-310(d)(2)(B). When this is the case, the court "need not
make the findings required" by the modified absolute priority rule.
189. Ironically, the proposal as interpreted here represents a return to the pre-1952
state of affairs. Prior to that time, a Chapter XI composition plan had to be "fair and
equitable," unless it was unanimously accepted by all affected creditors, in which case
no such finding had to be made. There was serious question as to how the insolvent
corporatioin could comply with the absolute priority rule if at the same time equity interests could not be affected by the plan. Accordingly, in 1952, the "fair and equitable"
requirement for Chapter XI plans was eliminated and the "best interests of creditors"
test was retained. See General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 471 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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definitive pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the subject.' 90

The valuation of the enterprise upon which the distribution of securities is based need only have a "reasonable basis," presumably a lessen-

ig of the burden of proof on the proponents of the plan on that issue. 9 ' Secondly, the securities issued and other consideration distributed under the plan must be shown only to have a "reasonable prob-

ability" of fully compensating the respective recipients in exchange for
their claims-presumably a softening of the burden of proof on this
issue. Aside from these provisions directed to burden of proof, the
other seemingly startling change from present case law comes in the
provision ostensibly altering the cast of characters who may participate
in the reorganized corporation.

First, section 7-303(3) provides that

a plan may include provisions for delayed participation rights for classes
of creditors or individuals who would otherwise have been eliminated
through strict application of the absolute priority rule, conditioned on

the court's determination within a period specified in the plan (but not
later than five years from the date of confirmation) that the reor-

ganized debtor or its successor has attained a "financial status that warrants such participation."'I9 Secondly, the draftsmen would specifically overrule the Supreme Court's holding in Case v. Los Angeles Lum190. The changes proposed in the absolute priority rule are exhaustively examined
in Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41
U. Cm. L. REV. 651 (1974); Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposed "Modifications" of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 AM. BANxRt. W. 305 (1974); and Note, 87
HARv. L. REv. supra note 185.
191. Coogan argues that this phrase has additional significance in that valuation
may be based on something other than capitalization of earnings, thus overruling sub
silentio the entire line of post-Boyd Supreme Court cases, cited supra note 161. Coogan,
supra note 136, at 752. There is nothing in the Commission Report or draftsman's notes
to the statute to support his view, and some evidence to the contrary exists, e.g.:
The Commission recommends that:
1. The fairness test be modified (a) by substituting for the unqualified "fair
and equitable" criterion, i.e., "absolute or strict priority," a test that precludes participation by junior interests where the going concern value does
not cover senior interests, but easing the evidentiary basis for the valuation of
the business ....
1 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 258 (emphasis added).
192. The basic unfairness of contingent participation in Chapter X plans has been
judicially recognized. See Spitzer v. Stichman, 278 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1960). Senior
creditors, denied the right to exercise bargained-for contractual protective remedies
against the debtor, must bear the full risk that the securities received in reorganization
are overvalued, and thus full compensation will not have been received, but are denied
the benefits of sharing in the residual value of the enterprise if it becomes profitablea "heads I win, tails you lose" situation. The Commission makes no attempt to justify
its approval of contingent participation in light of this criticism, and may, as subsequently suggested, simply be acknowledging reality and concluding that delayed participation is better than the alternative subterfuge for reaching the same result, through intentional overvaluation of the enterprise and the concomitant issuance of presently
worthless securities.
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ber Products Co. 193 that, to participate in the new capitalization of an
insolvent corporation, equity security holders must make a contribution
equal to the intrinsic value of the securities received "in money or
money's worth." In Case Mr. Justice Douglas held that the promise
of future services did not constitute "money or money's worth."1 4
The draftsmen could not make their contempt for this holding more
plain; under proposed section 7-303(4) a plan may provide for participation by such equity security holders if the court finds that they "will
make a contribution which is important to the operation of the reorganized debtor or the successor under the plan," so long as such participation "reasonably approximates the value, if any, of their interests
and the additional estimated value of such contribution."
The conclusion which this author reaches from examining these
provisions that purport to modify the absolute priority principle is that
the Commission has simply called a spade a spade and redefined the
standard to accord with the practice. With respect to the current application of absolute priority in Chapter X, the Supreme Court has
made clear that the appropriate valuation technique for determination
of rights of participation in the reorganized corporation is capitalization
of earnings.'" "Inthe uncomplicated situation, in which substantial portions of the assets are not being depleted, nor is a limited life predicted
for a portion of the business, valuation pursuant to this formulation may
be stated algebraically as V=I/i, where I equals the "typical annual
earnings figure that the reorganized corporation can be expected to attain in the future, and i equals the appropriate capitalization rate for determining the present value of that stream of earnings in perpetuity.
There is much learning as to generally acceptable practice for determining both I and i, but the inescapable fact remains that the process involves solving an algebraic formula in which all of the elements are unknowns. It is hardly surprising, then, that the valuation process, despite
the rubric of accepted practice and requirement of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, is at best a ballpark guess and at worst a wild
figment of some "expert's" imagination. 906 Predictably, suspicions arise
193. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
194. Id. at 122.
195. Protective Comm. for Independent Stockholders v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414
(1968); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
196. Even Mr. Justice Douglas had to admit that "an estimate, as distinguished from
mathematical certitude, is all that can be made." Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du
Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941).
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that the actual process in many cases is the determination of the desired
V, and that I and i are filled in accordingly. And, of course, the primary consequence of a bigger or smaller V is the degree of participation of junior interests in the reorganized enterprise. If the Supreme
Court is going to be so ornery as to suggest that contributions as a basis
of participation must be in money or money's worth, and that does not
include future services to be provided by the manager-equity holders,
simply make the insolvent corporation solvent on a capitalized earnings
basis, which is most easily and least noticeably accomplished by a relatively small decrease in i. 19 7 The same process can be used to give
an interest to non-manager equity holders in an insolvent corporation.
To be sure, the securities issued to such equity holders most likely will
turn out to be worthless, but that is not the relevant consideration. For
the manager-equity holders, the prime concern is retention of control
over the corporation through equity ownership, and, therefore, retention of their management positions. For the non-manager equity owners, their claims were worthless anyway, so at worst they remain worthless. At best, if the corporation has reorganized and ends up successful, they will have received a substantial windfall at the expense of
the creditors, who would, without the benign manipulation of the valuation figures, have ended up as the equity holders, and, therefore, as the
beneficiaries of the reorganized corporation's success. Thus, despite
the wide attention given to these alterations in current Chapter X
standards, it may be cogently argued that all the Commission has done
is to apply the bitter lesson of Prohibition: it is pointless to legislate
when the protected class does not want to be protected.
It follows that, despite all the sound and fury, there may be no
particular barrier to the continuation of Chapter XE-type compositions
in a vast number of cases.'19 When management owns a large chunk
of the equity, and there is not unanimous acceptance of the plan so
that the explicit statutory exception will not apply, all that stands between a composition plan and confirmation is a finding by a cooperative
judge that the managers will contribute services equal to the value of
these equity interests. 9 9 When there are a substantial number of non197. For example, a predicted annual earnings stream of $100,000 capitalized at ten
percent results in a valuation of $1,000,000, whereas the same earnings stream capitalized at twelve percent results in a valuation of only $833,333.
198. Of course, if Coogan is correct, there will be very few cases where compositions are not permitted. See text accompanying notes 184-89 supra. The truth, it is
submitted, lies in between Coogan's reading and a literal reading.
199. It is unrealistic to the point of absurdity to accept the proposed standard for
participation based on future services in any literal sense. It is nothing more than a
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managing stockholders, the lesser standard of proof both as to valuation
of the enterprise and full compensation to senior interests should
permit a finding of at least some residue of value available to them.
If not, there is at least the possibility of delayed participation rights.
Whether or not such a plan is a "composition" as that term is understood in Chapter XI usage is a question of platonic philosophy rather
than law. Such a plan changes the form and schedule of payment of
unsecured debt, and leaves management and its equity interests virtually intact. 20 0 It does not, however, leave all equity interests intact,
although they clearly may be affected less than is required under Chapter X. The irony here is that for all of the softening of the harsh effects of the absolute priority rule as presently applied, the fundamental
defect of the rule is uncorrected: the only group whose interests must
be adversely affected by the new, more benign version of the rule is
public equity investors-the very group most in need of protection.
On this reading, then, application of the modified absolute priority
standard for virtually all cases will not, if a reasonably pragmatic appro ach is taken, eliminate composition settlements, but will merely place
outside limits on the bargain that may be struck as to going-concern
value. It may be questioned whether the Coogan approach 20 1 would
not have been better, inasmuch as it would permit public equity holders
to escape the effects of even the modified absolute priority rule so long
as there are no outstanding public unsecured creditors who need the
protection of the rule.
Even on a narrow reading, however, the standards leave room for
considerable bargaining over going-concern value, albeit with very
definite outside limits. When sophisticated trade creditors and lending
rubric to permit present management to remain at the helm with its interests intact,
where that is appropriate. Were the standard to be taken seriously, it would necessarily
follow that management has been compensated for future services in the form of common stock and is entitled to no additional compensation, monetary or otherwise, when
the services are actually performed. Nobody, however, has suggested that this clearly
unacceptable result would follow. Therefore, either management is being paid for its
services twice under this standard, or the standard is more metaphorical than real. Furthermore, many state corporation statutes specifically or indirectly prohibit the issuance
of stock in exchange for future services. E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 18
(1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (1974). Finally, if the stock were literally being
issued for future services, its value would constitute taxable ordinary income to the recipient. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (4) (1975).
200. It may be seriously questioned whether the policy behind this "hands off" approach is consistent with the policy behind Proposed Act § 4-406, which automatically
and indiscriminately subordinates all insiders' creditor claims to all other unsubordinated
but allowable claims.
201. See note 136 and accompanying text supra.
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institutions bargain away part of the going-concern value that would
be theirs if liquidation rights were the sole measure of participation,
they do so out of knowledgeable self-interest, based on the expected
generation of future business, development of their own good will, protection against loss from personal guarantees or other sources, etc.
When, on the other hand, the going-concern value is allocated to junior
interests at the expense of public investor creditors, no such pragmatic determination has been made, or indeed could be made, given
the vast differences of position of members of that group. Thus, negotiated composition settlements should not be discouraged in the former
case, but treated very warily in the latter. The ostensible application
of the modified absolute priority standard in all cases will protect public
creditors from having a composition settlement foisted upon them that
would allocate "too much" of the going-concern value to the equity
holders if it would be unfair to do so. Such an application should,
however, permit almost any other agreed-upon bargain, limited in the
final analysis only by a loose standard of rationality as to values assigned
to the enterprise and to the future services to be provided. 'I'he higher
standard of "feasibility" required in Chapter VII will help to assure that
the sacrificing creditor will ultimately get at least as much as he is supposed to get, and, if he receives equity and the corporation is successful, possibly more-an exchange of some compensation for greater certainty of receiving that which he is promised. On2 this reading, the
term "fair and equitable" would come to mean "fair" in a pragmatic
and nontechnical sense. In the hands of fairminded and intelligent
administrators and bankruptcy judges, the flexible standard suggested
here will result in maximum justice in a maximum number of cases.
The quality of the personnel is crucially important, since the statutory
standards, coupled with the gloss provided on them, would make judicial review inordinately difficult.
If this reading of the confirmation standards turns out to be at all
accurate, the other criticisms of the proposals made herein become ultimately less important. For, at the price of some greater expense and
delay, composition settlements more closely supervised for fairness will
be the order of the day-a not undesirable result. In that case, not
only will the baby be saved from disposal, but the bath water itself will
have been significantly sweetened. To the extent that compositiontype arrangements will still be achievable, although within a somewhat
narrower range of cases, the result will be to increase the flexibility
in attaining that goal in several important respects.
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First, there is annoyingly persistent case law under Chapter XI
to the effect that a plan cannot "merely" provide for the liquidation
of the debtor and distribution of the proceeds to creditors. In In re
Pure Penn Petroleum Co.202 the court refused to read into Chapter XI

the authorization, explicit in Chapter X, 20 3 for a plan providing for the
sale of all assets. It recognized only two situations, neither of which
were applicable on the facts, in which a Chapter XI debtor could sell
all its assets: (1) an emergency in which immediate sale is required
to prevent loss of value, and (2) a variant of the emergency context,
in which the assets are perishable.

While the Pure Penn rationale can occasionally be circumvented, 0 4 the principle remains a formidable barrier to plans of liquidation, even though the "best interests of creditors" test would be satisfied.20 5 In Pure Penn, the court evidenced concern for the stockholders, who would have no standing to participate in the Chapter XI proceeding, inasmuch as they cannot be "affected" thereby, but who, the
court apparently felt, were entitled to the protections surrounding a
bankruptcy liquidation 206 even though the debtor was grossly insolvent
and the stockholders would receive nothing in any kind of liquidation.
It is difficult to reconcile the Pure Penn rationale with the many situations in Chapter XI in which plans that have had substantial indirect
20 7
effect upon equity security holders have been readily approved.
202. 188 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1951).
203. Bankruptcy Act § 216, 11 U.s.c. § 616 (1970) (Chapter X), provides in part:
A plan of reorganization under this chapter10) shall provide adequate means for the execution of the plan, which may
include . . . the sale of all or any part of its property either subject to or
free from any lien, at not less than a fair upset price and the distribution of
all or any assets, or the proceeds derived from the sale thereof, among those
having an interest ....
For application of that provision, see Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 338 F.2d 1006
(8th Cir. 1964). No comparable provision is contained in Chapter XI.
204. See In re Blair & Co., 471 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 212
(1973); In re Northern Ill. Dev. Corp., 324 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 938 (1964). There is, however, some danger in making the attempt, as the Second
Circuit recently suggested in dictum that if the Chapter XI petition is merely an attempt
to avoid inevitable liquidation, legal fees of the attorney for the debtor in possession may
be denied. In re Casco Fashions, Inc., 490 F.2d 1197, 1204 (2d Cir. 1973).
205. See In re Ira Haupt & Co., 234 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aII'd sub nona.
Ira Haupt & Co. v. Klebanow, 348 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1965).
206. "This would mean that a Chapter XI plan could bring about the same result
as ordinary bankruptcy proceedings but minus the protective provisions which are part
of the latter, especially as to a sale of all the assets." 188 F.2d at 855.
207. Any time common stock of the debtor is issued in exchange for unsecured
claims, equity security holders are obviously adversely affected by the plan through the
dilution of their interests. See Posi-Seal Int'l, Inc. v. Chipperfield, 457 F.2d 237 (2d
Cir. 1972), in which the confirmation of a plan conditioned on a consummated recap-
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Proposed Chapter VII adopts the Chapter X scheme on liquidating plans. Section 7-205 authorizes the sale of "all or substantially all
of the property of the estate." However, it provides protection by requiring court authorization after notice and hearing, to be granted only
"if in the best interests of the estate." The Official Note to this section
states that no emergency need be found for such a sale to be allowed.
In addition, liquidation plans are permitted under Chapter VII. Section 7-303(9) expressly provides that a Chapter VII plan may contain
provisions for the sale of all assets of the debtor.
Another area where proposed Chapter VII will actually aid in the
consummation of composition plans is with respect to the staying of the
rights of secured creditors. Under the Bankruptcy Rules for Chapter
XI, the filing of a petition operates as a stay of "any act or the commencement or continuation of any court proceeding to enforce any lien
against [the debtor's] property." 08 Unless the secured party seeks relief from the stay, the stay "shall continue until the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to bankruptcy or the property subject to the lien
is, with the approval of the court, abandoned or transferred."' 09 While
this rule represents a substantial departure from earlier practice, under
which the stay of secured creditors had to be sought by the debtor,21 0
the procedural change does not alter the substantive criteria for ending
the stay vis a vis a specific secured creditor.2 1 ' There are substantial
jurisdictional and judicially developed limitations on the bankruptcy
court's power in this regard.
The automatic stay provision is limited by the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. In a Cthapter XI proceeding, that court
has "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and his property, wherever located."2 12 While this provision is sometimes read to limit the court's
jurisdiction to property in the actual or constructive possession of the
debtor, 213 the broader and better view permits jurisdiction pursuant
italization pursuant to state law was approved. See also Flora Mir Candy Corp., No.
69-B-316 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 2, 1971), aff'd per curiam, 454 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1971), in
which the court permitted the conversion feature of convertible debentures to be rejected as an executory contract, thus turning contingent equity interests into unsecured
debt which was then scaled down in the plan. In this connection see also In re Sequential Information Systems, Inc., BANKR. L. RP.
64,401 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
208. R. BANlR. P. 11-44(a).
209. Id. 11-44(b).
210. Bankruptcy Act § 311, 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1970).
211. Cf. R. BANER. P. 928: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of courts of bankruptcy over subject matter."
212. Bankruptcy Act § 311, 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1970).
213. 9 H. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF TnE UNIrED
STATES § 3573, at 214-18 (6th ed. 1955).
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thereto to be based upon title in the debtor, even though possession
is in a third party. 214 However, where a third party is in possession
of property claimed by the debtor pursuant to a substantial adverse
claim of right, the bankruptcy court, even under the broad view of its
jurisdiction, loses any right it would have otherwise had to make orders
respecting that property. 215 The other two bases of jurisdiction frequently cited as available to the bankruptcy court in Chapter XI cases,
the All Writs Statute 1 " and the inherent equity powers of a bankruptcy
court,21 7 will not in this situation aid the court in the exercise of power
over that property.
Even if the court has summary jurisdiction to make orders with
respect to the property in question, that jurisdiction is not without restrictions. Case law makes clear that the equities, as between the
debtor and secured creditor, must be carefully weighed. Accordingly,
a stay should be continued where relief is sought by the secured creditor only if it is essential to the Chapter XI proceeding and if the lienor
will not suffer substantial injury thereby. 218 The latter requirement is
usually met by a showing that the value of the property exceeds the
security interest.2 19 Thus the possibility that economic depreciation
will cause a decline in the value of the collateral has been recognized
as resulting in injury to creditors, and, unless a plan is imminent, further stay will be denied.220 If the lien is upon property that is unrelated to the business that is the subject of the Chapter XI proceeding,
the secured creditor will ordinarily be allowed to foreclose. 221 Also,
if there are sufficient other assets in the business to meet creditors'
claims, a court will hesitate to restrain secured parties.2 2
The dual findings cited above are often not enough to assure the
continued stay. Injunctions granted as essential to the confirmation of
a plan have been conditioned upon compensation to the secured creditor. In In re Atlantic Steel Products Corp. 23 foreclosure on a chattel
214. See 8 W. COLLmER, supra note 45, 1 3.01, at 146-47.
215. In re Stockman Dev. Co., 447 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
923 (1972); In re Barasch, 439 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1971).
216. 28 U.S.C. 1651 (1970).
217. See Bankruptcy Act § 2a(15), 11 U.S.C. § Ila(15) (1970).
218. In re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
219. In re Atlantic Steel Prods. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
220. In re Holiday Lodge, Inc., 300 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 824 (1962); In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1964).
221. Mundt v. Southland Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 354 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1965); In re
Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Cal. 1961).

222. In re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
223.

31 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
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mortgage on the debtor's plant and equipment was stayed so long as
the debtor paid the accrued and monthly interest and so much of the
principal as possible from its income remaining after payment of cur224
rent operating expenses. A debtor-lessee in In re Lane Foods, Inc.
obtained a stay of execution of an eviction warrant conditioned upon
weekly rental payments to the lessor in advance.
Furthermore, a secured creditor will not be stayed beyond confirmation of the plan.2 25 Inasmuch as the plan cannot affect the secured
creditor, to the extent that he is not satisfied with the result he still
may be able to foreclose upon his security interest and effectively terminate the business as soon as the plan has been confirmed. Because
of this inability to affect secured creditors' rights beyond a stay of foreclosure for the minimum necessary period, it is doubtful whether Chapter XI courts can force surrender of the debtor's property by a secured
creditor who is in possession before the filing of the Chapter XI petition. 226 Indeed, one commentator has even questioned whether rule
11-44, the automatic stay provision, applies in the case of a secured
creditor in possession prior to filing.227 Whatever the ultimate outcome of these issues when they are litigated, it is clear that a Chapter
XI court cannot authorize the sale of property on which there is a lien
and allow the proceeds to be used for any purpose other than payment
228
of the secured debt.
All of the above is consistent with the first principle that, while
a debtor should have reasonable opportunity to pull itself together without interference in order to propose a plan, the plan cannot affect secured creditors, and, therefore, these creditors cannot be economically
injured by the attempt to reach a composition settlement. Given the
different scope of a Chapter X plan, far more extensive powers to affect the rights of secured creditors during the course of the proceeding
exist. First, it is quite clear that a Chapter X stay will reach property
in the possession of secured creditors, and that secured creditors can
be ordered to return pledged property for use in the continuing business.2 20 In addition, pursuant to certain judicially adopted safeguards,
224. 213 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
225. R. BANKR. P. 11-44(b) provides in part: "the stay shall continue until the
case is closed, dismissed, or converted to bankruptcy. .. ."
226. See Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reorganization and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAw. 15, 41 (1974).
227. Id. at 42.
228. In re Camp Packing Co., 146 F. Supp. 935 (N.D.N.Y. 1956).
229. Bankruptcy Act §§ 111, 257, 11 U.S.C. §§ 511, 657 (1970). For an extreme
application of this principle, see R.F.C. v. Kaplan, 185 F.2d 791 (lst Cir. 1950).
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property collateralizing a debt can be sold by the debtor, and the proceeds used for purposes other than payment of the secured creditor's
claim. 23 0 Finally, and most far reaching, important Second Circuit
opinions stand for the proposition that even creditors secured by depreciating collateral can be denied both reclamation and interim compensation during the court-supervised operation of the debtor's business.23 '
The theory is that a plan, consistent with the absolute priority principle,
will necessarily fully compensate the secured creditor for his claim to
the extent that it was secured on the date of the filing of the petition.
Obviously, if no plan is ultimately confirmed, the secured creditor will
have been damaged by the stay. Accordingly, the standard for denial
of all compensation in this situation is that the plan be more than "a
mere will-of-the-wisp. 232
Whatever the merits of the application of this standard in Chapter
X, it is clear that its application would be entirely inappropriate in
Chapter XI, inasmuch as a secured creditor will not be fully compensated by a plan; indeed, he cannot be affected against his will. However, the intention of proposed Chapter VII is to permit the debtor to
tamper with the secured creditor's rights to the same extent as currently
allowed under the most far-reaching case law. 233 This means that a
composition-type plan with unsecured creditors, to the extent that they
are still permitted in Chapter VII, will not be aborted because of the
intervening rights of a secured creditor. Thus, for example, in refusing
to lift the stay of the secured creditor's rights to foreclose or repossess,
the court may impose conditions that may include:
1. requiring other security of an equivalent value; 2. if there is no
equity or the equity is marginal, requiring additional security to the
extent of the anticipated decrease in the value of collateral as a result of use; and 3. giving a priority if it is clear that the proceeds of
the liquidation of the 234
property of the estate available to pay the
claim will be sufficient.
230. Compare In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952) with
Central R.R. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 421 F.2d 604 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 949 (1970). See also In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.
1974), which elevates the standards to constitutional requirements.
231. In re Yale Express System, Inc., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967); In re Yale Express System, Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966). For a complete examination of the
Yale Express holding and the problem it relates to, see Rosenberg, Beyond Yale Express:
CorporateReorganization and the Secured Creditor'sRights of Reclamation, 123 U. PA.
L. REv. 509 (1975).
232. See In re Yale Express Sysem, Inc., 384 F.2d 990, 991 (2d Cir. 1967).
233. See Proposed Act § 7-203, Advisory Comm. Note 1.
234. Id. § 7-203, Advisory Comm. Note 3.
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This catalogue does not include the most far-reaching aspect of the case
law that the section purports to codify-no immediate consideration at
all to the secured creditor, and full compensation in the plan to be consummated at a later time. Thus, in the plan as finally confirmeda plan that is otherwise a composition plan-the secured creditor whose
rights were affected by the stay pending confirmation simply need be
given consideration equal to the value of his security on the date of
the petition. That consideration can take the form of any of the abovequoted provisions, or any other form deemed equitable. If the secured
creditor in question refuses to accept the consideration provided in the
plan, the "cramdown" provisions (another carryover from present
Chapter X) provide that the plan can be confirmed over his objection
as long as the judge finds the alternative consideration "equitable. ' 2 5
Clearly, a major obstacle to the confirmation of composition plans will
have been removed in proposed Chapter VII in this way.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It must be emphasized that the above discussion does not cover
all of the changes in the current law of corporate rehabilitation proposed in the Bankruptcy Act of 1973. The virtually all-inclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts,23 6 the initial injunction against the exercise of the right of setoff, 2 7 the injunction against termination of
public utility service,2"" and the nonenforcement of ipso facto
termination clauses in leases 23 9 will all aid the rehabilitation process.
Furthermore, the stylistic as well as substantive alterations of current
practice which the conversion to administrative bankruptcy will bring
should not be underestimated, although a detailed analysis at this time
would require the services of a clairvoyant. What is clear to this author
is that the doomsday rhetoric of some Chapter XI advocates is at best
premature and at worst irresponsible. A sympathetic reading of the
proposed statute leads to the conclusion that Chapter XI-type compositions will remain a viable form of relief, but only where that form of
relief is appropriate under the circumstances in light of the nature of
the business and the parties interested in it, and with safeguards to
minimize the opportunities for insiders to overreach those classes of interested parties that are not capable of fully protecting themselves.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§
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7-303(7).
2-201.
7-204.
7-105.
4-602(b).
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It is not difficult to find fault with specific choices made by the
Commission in pursuit of that dual goal, as this author has done. Hopefully, during the legislative process, which at this writing is still in the
early stages, the criticisms made here and elsewhere will be considered,
and in some of its specifics the final legislation will be improved. However, if the analysis of some of the provisions herein is correct, it must
be concluded that the draftsmen, far from radically discarding Chapter XI, have conservatively reworked it, preserving that which is good
and eliminating that which, in the light of almost forty years' experience, has proved to be unfair.

